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There is much in common between the agricultural sectors of the United States and Canada. 
This chapter begins with a brief background on the two sectors, then reviews their histories of 
farm policy developments before reporting new estimates of rates of assistance to their 
farmers and their consequences for taxpayers and consumers. This is followed by an 
explanation of the politics behind the evolution and gyrations in farm policies in the two 
countries, and some speculation on the prospect for reform. Since the policy histories and 
their effects in the two countries are somewhat different, they are discussed sequentially in 
those sections.  
The number of farms in North America has been falling for decades, a well known 
story that has given the public a sense that agriculture is a hard-pressed industry in decline. 
What is less well known is that the decline has greatly slowed in the last twenty years. During 
the 1950s and 1960s the number of U.S. farms fell at the rate of 3.0 percent annually (falling 
by half in 20 years), but between 1995 and 2005 the number declined by 4 percent for the 
whole decade (Appendix Figure 1).
1  
To understand the situation it is necessary to look at the picture separately for farms 
of different sizes. The number of farms with sales over $500,000 annually quadrupled 
between 1978 and 2005, from 18,000 to 79,000. The number having sales between $100,000 
and $500,000 has increased too. What is most surprising is that the number with sales of less 
than $25,000 per year has held quite steady. The category that has declined most significantly 
in recent decades are those between $25,000 and $100,000 in sales.  
U.S. land in farms has been gradually declining too, at an annual rate of 0.4 percent 
since 1950, which over the years since then has added up to a loss of about 230 million acres 
of farmland. However, available cropland acreage has remained almost constant over this 
period, with 345 million acres harvested in 1950 and 321 million acres in 2005. Considering 
                                                 
1 This chapter’s coverage of the US draws to some extent on Gardner (2002).  
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the increase in irrigated and better-drained acreage, quality-adjusted cropland may even have 
increased slightly. Together with declining farm numbers, the acreage data imply an increase 
in the average size of farms. But as the decline in numbers has slowed a lot in recent decades, 
so has the growth in average farm size. In 2005 the average U.S. farm had 444 acres (180 
ha.), and 30 years earlier the average size was 431 acres (175 ha.). 
The number of farms in Canada peaked in 1941. In the 40 years between 1961 and 
2001, Canada lost half its farms, their number declining from 480,000 to 246,000 (Appendix 
Figure 2). This is a rate of decline of 1.7 percent annually, faster than the U.S. rate of 1.4 
percent during this period. Canada’s land devoted to cultivated crops has declined over the 
1960-2000 period also, but less rapidly than the number of farms, so that Canada had 111 
hectares of cropland per farm in 1961 and 147 in 2001 (as compared to about 75 hectares of 
cropland per U.S. farm in 2002). Yields and value of output per hectare of cropland were 
however lower in Canada than in the U.S., reflecting the cooler and drier climate of Canada 
generally. Total agricultural land declined much more slowly in Canada than in the U.S., 
indeed hardly at all, from 69.8 million hectares in 1961 to 67.5 million in 2001. 
While the number of farms is declining only slowly, the farm labor force continues to 
fall mainly because of less unpaid family labor other than the operator. At the same time, the 
use of material inputs (fertilizers, fuels, purchased feed additives) has doubled in the U.S. 
since 1950. USDA’s aggregate input index is remarkably constant. It was 102 in both 1950 
and 2000 (relative to a base of 1996=100). But agricultural output has continued to grow at a 
steady clip, so total factor productivity growth has been an impressive 1.9 percent per annum 
(Appendix Figure 3), with no evidence of slowdown in the trend in recent years despite 
energy price shocks, environmental constraints and concerns about exhaustion of TFP gains 
attributable to earlier breakthroughs in improved hybrid seeds and other innovations. So far 
continued advances in genetics, livestock management, capital equipment, and economies of 
scale have kept the real cost of U.S. farm products on a pronounced downward path. These 
cost declines have been largely reflected in lower prices of farm products and hence lower 
costs of raw materials for foods. While the average price of farm products rose 40 percent 
between 1978 and 2005 (1.2 percent per year), the GDP deflator rose at an annual rate of 3.2 
percent. Thus the real price of agricultural output fell by an average of 2.0 percent during this 
period – essentially the same as the rate of TFP growth. 
Overall farm size (in terms of total land and output per farm) increased in Canada at a 
rate faster than in the U.S. As of 2001, the average Canadian farm had 670 acres as compared  
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to 440 in the U.S. The more extensive nature of Canadian agriculture has not hindered output 
or productivity growth though: real output per farm increased more rapidly than farm size 
(Appendix Figure 4), reflecting increased yields per hectare and a strong trend in total factor 
productivity growth, which has been estimated to increase 2.5 percent annually in recent 
decades (Furtan 2006). 
The fact that farm prices have fallen in real terms largely in parallel with cost 
decreases indicates that real incomes of farmers may not have benefited from farm 
productivity growth. Yet the incomes of farm people have in fact grown, in real dollar terms 
and relative to real incomes of the nonfarm population. Not only in the 1930s 
Depression/Dust Bowl years but also through the 1960s, farm households could be 
reasonably categorized as a low-income population. Sustained equality between the two 
populations was however reached by the 1990s, and since 2000 U.S. farm household incomes 
have been significantly higher than nonfarm incomes (Figure 1). 
How has this income growth been achieved, given that the decline in real prices has 
equaled the decline in farmers’ costs of production? The answer is the increasing importance 
of farm households’ integration into the nonfarm economy, so that in recent years off-farm 
income sources account for 85 to 90 percent of average U.S. farm household incomes 
(Appendix Table 1). These data suggest that income from farming itself may indeed be quite 
low. However, a full understanding of the farm income data requires consideration of 
differences between farms of different sizes. Numerically a majority of farms, 87 percent of 
them in 2004, have less than $10,000 annually in sales. The costs of farming at this scale are 
such that these farms on average earned only $1,020 from farming, and more than half are 
estimated to have losses from their farm enterprises. Nonetheless, the average household 
income of these farms is $71,500 thanks to off-farm income. At the other end of the 
spectrum, family farms classified by USDA as commercial scale operations (those which 
have $250,000 or more in sales) earned an average of $145,300 from farming plus $46,038 
from off-farm sources, and these latter farms produce more than two-thirds of U.S. 
agricultural output.
2  
                                                 
2 There is one category of farms in the USDA classification that has low incomes both from farming and from 
off-farm sources, called “limited resource farms”. There were an estimated 199,000 such farms in 2004, ten 
percent of all farms, and their average household income was $7,700. Their average farm earnings was a loss of 
$5,900. Apart from these farms, the other 90 percent of U.S. farm households are doing well economically, 
either from farm or off-farm income sources. The data underlying this and subsequent information about farm 
household economics are developed by the Economic Research Service of USDA, using their Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey of about 10,000 farms annually.  
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Net income from farming in Canada over the five years 2001-05 averaged almost the 
same as the average U.S. net income per farm, and Canadian net farm income is similarly 
highly variable from year to year.
3 However, Canadian farm households receive on average 






We begin with an extensive discussion of U.S. policies, and then discuss the somewhat 




Legislative proposals in the U.S. to improve the economic situation of farmers through 
governmental intervention in commodity markets were first developed conceptually as 
remedies for the precipitous fall in product prices in the aftermath of World War I. After 
several failed attempts to enact farm support bills in the 1920s, the further decline in 
agriculture’s situation with the onset of the Great Depression of 1929-32 led to legislative 
success in the landmark New Deal programs beginning in 1933. These programs had the 
principal purposes of increasing the incomes of farm people (with an explicit goal stated in 
terms of “parity” of farm income with reference to a pre-World War I standard) and 
stabilization of farmers’ revenues. The fateful choice was to attempt to achieve both these 
goals by means of supporting farmers’ prices received for a subset of commodities (“basic” 
commodities in U.S. law -- initially wheat, corn, cotton, rice, tobacco, pork and milk).  
Already in the 1930s the four main feasible means of market intervention in pursuit of 
higher producer receipts had been implemented for key commodities: production controls; 
government purchases of commodities for stockpiling at price support “loan rates” at which 
farmers could forfiet the basic commodities instead of making repayment of the loan plus 
interest; disposal of surplus stocks through distribution or subsidized sale for export or to 
domestic consumers; and direct payments to producers. The first direct payments, in 1933, 
                                                 
3 For 2001-05 the annual net incomes per farm that yields the C$11 thousand average are, respectively: 11.0, 
6.0, 11.1, 16.4, and 10.6 (Statistics Canada 2006).  
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were tied to farmers’ idling of land or destruction of livestock, so from their inception they 
were not classical production-inducing subsidies. 
In 1936 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had no authority to 
administer land-idling acreage controls under New Deal farm legislation, on the 
Constitutional grounds “that powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural 
production is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden.” 
(U.S. Supreme Court 1936). Subsequently, the Court’s alleged respect for precedent was not 
extended to this decision, and many later production control measures have passed 
Constitutional muster.
4 At the time, the result of the Court’s decision was a merger of prior 
concerns about conservation with measures to remove acreage from commodity production. 
This was done in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 principally by 
defining “soil-depleting” crops (the main basic commodities) and “soil-conserving” crops 
(grasses and legumes), and paying farmers to substitute the latter for the former.  
Trade policy was almost negligible in the 1930s’ programs. The policy proposals of 
the 1920s, in contrast, had given a central role to export promotion. The Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff, signed into law in July 1930 (despite a petition to President Hoover signed by over 
1,000 economists asking that he veto the bill) protected manufacturing much more than 
agricultural products. It is notable, however, that the crossover Democratic votes needed to 
pass the bill in the Senate (the Republicans then being the main protectionists and the 
Democrats free-traders) were lured by the desire to protect sugar (Louisiana), wool 
(Wyoming), and Florida fruit (Benedict 1953, p. 251). By 1934 it was clear that even these 
elevated tariffs were insufficient to protect sugar, and the first Sugar Act added sugar to the 
list of basic commodities, authorizing import and production quotas. With respect to overall 
agricultural trade, by 1934 the combination of Depression and trade restrictions in the US and 
elsewhere reduced both US agricultural exports and imports to about $600 million per year, 
one-sixth of the levels of 1920. 
Experience during and after World War II made it apparent that export demand was 
capable of creating farm prosperity to an extent, and with far less cost and turmoil, than a 
decade of intensive effort by the federal government had been able to deliver in the 1930s. 
Under the Marshall Plan, U.S. exports of foodstuffs were 19 million tons annually in 1947-
                                                 
4 The Court changed its view in decisions of 1939 and 1942 upholding, respectively, tobacco and wheat 
marketing controls enacted in legislation of  1938 (Mulford v. Smith (1939) and Wickard v. Filburn (1942)). 
The reasoning was that agricultural production affected by such programs influenced national markets and so 
could be legislated under constitutional powers to regulate interstate commerce.  
 
6
50, compared to 4 million tons in 1935-39. However, three aspects of the situation in the U.S. 
were obstacles to free-trade ideas in agriculture. First, the Marshall Plan and subsequent 
agricultural exports were in large part financed by subsidies rather than being bought abroad 
at world market prices. Second, U.S. commodity policy held some domestic commodity 
prices above world levels, so that import restrictions were vital to these policies (otherwise 
the program would have to support the world price and not just the U.S. price). Third, the 
relatively few US importable farm commodities, notably sugar, dairy products, and some 
meats and fruits, had sufficient political power to maintain protection via tariffs or quotas 
even when giving them up as part of a larger trade liberalization agreement would have been 
beneficial to the nation as a whole. 
Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 required import quotas to be 
imposed if imports threatened the effectiveness of a price support program. This situation led 
the United States to join Europe in pressing for a waiver of agricultural products from 
agreements of GATT members to reduce export subsidies or provide increased import access 
to their markets. Some experts argued vigorously for changing U.S. farm programs to make 
them compatible with liberal trade, notably in the “Brannan Plan” of 1948 and other 
proposals to replace production controls and price supports by payments to farmers and 
adjustment assistance (Johnson 1950). But U.S. policy did not turn to favoring the inclusion 
of agriculture in the GATT until the 1960s. By then European farm policy had decisively 
taken a protectionist path that precluded significant agricultural trade liberalization. 
Beginning with the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954 (P.L. 480), U.S. 
policy followed a path suggested by the Marshall Plan of using food aid to foreign countries 
as a mechanism for surplus disposal. During 1956-64 about one-fourth of U.S. agricultural 
exports that were shipped under this program. P.L. 480 exports had varying degrees of 
concessionary pricing, depending on the status of the importing country, but overall there is a 
substantial subsidy element in these exports. Since the 1970s the program has shipped a fairly 
constant amount of just under $1 billion in commodities annually. In addition, going back to 
1935, government-provided export credit and guarantees of repayment to private sector 
lenders have been used to stimulate foreign demand for U.S. commodities. Exports have also 
been promoted through USDA grants to farm or commercial interests for the purpose of 
informational and sales efforts abroad. Revamped as the Marketing Assistance Program in 
1990, such programs still spend about $100 million annually.  
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More explicit export subsidies were paid through most of the post-World War II 
period, most notably in wheat where their role was negotiated under the International Wheat 
Agreement starting in 1949.
5 In the 1960s more than 85 percent of U.S. wheat exports were 
assisted by subsidies. Then during the worldwide commodities boom of the 1970s it appeared 
that the era of export subsidies might be replaced by commodity scarcity, with trade policies 
restraining rather than subsidizing exports. The US embargoed grain shipments to the Soviet 
Union and a few other countries for short periods during 1974-80. Commodity scarcity 
proved temporary, however. The worldwide collapse in commodity prices of the 1980s 
provided the stimulus for export promotion programs. The European Community intensified 
its longstanding practice of export subsidies (Josling 2008). The U.S. began offering specific-
destination export subsidies in retaliation in the early 1980s, and regularized this approach in 
the Export Enhancement Program, established under Executive authority of the Reagan 
Administration starting in 1983. Canada met the subsidy competition where feasible through 
pricing policies of the Canadian Wheat Board. 
The Export Enhancement Program (EEP), like the pre-1970s export subsidies, was 
first and foremost a wheat program. It began as low-price government sales in North Africa 
in 1983 of wheat stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) as a result of the 
domestic price support programs. The mechanism was complicated, using a payment-in-kind 
approach. USDA would determine particular countries and commodities for which it believed 
export subsidies would be helpful in selling U.S. products. Exporters would then negotiate a 
deal with a foreign buyer at a price discounted from prevailing world trading prices. The 
exporter would then apply to USDA for a payment sufficient to make up the difference 
between the market price and the negotiated discount price. USDA, if it approved the sale, 
would give the exporter sufficient wheat from CCC stocks to cover the payment, called the 
export “bonus.” By the late 1980s the bonuses were adding up to a billion dollars annually, 
with over 80 percent of EEP commodities accounted for by wheat in 1985-89. The program 
was widened and generalized so that CCC wheat stocks could be used to subsidize exports of 
other commodities, and in 1990, when available CCC wheat stocks were exhausted, in-kind 
bonuses were replaced by cash. 
                                                 
5 An earlier wheat agreement, in 1933, created a schedule of quotas limiting the shipments of wheat by 
exporting countries, but this proto-OPEC broke down and the agreement was allowed to expire in 1935 (Gale 
and Zaglits 1949). Explicit export subsidies were also implemented for a time early on in the New Deal, on 
Northwestern US wheat (Nourse, Davis, and Black 1935, pp. 93-95).  
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As the U.S. expanded its export subsidies in the 1980s, Europe and Canada, within 
their respective support structures, met the competition with increased export subsidies of 
their own. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was a natural venue for mutual 
agreement to rein in this costly competition. After long and tortuous negotiations, the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) contained disciplines that, together with 
strategic rethinking and changed grain market conditions, greatly reduced the role of export 
subsidies after the mid-1990s in both the U.S. and European Union. Both have agreed such 
subsidies should be outlawed, and that has allowed farm policy discussion in the WTO’s 
current Doha Round to focus primarily on market access (import protection via tariffs and 
quotas) and domestic price supports via subsidy payments to producers. 
 
Import protection measures 
International trade policy was a hot political issue in the U.S. a hundred years before the first 
domestic commodity support programs were enacted. Manufacturing interests of the North 
wanted protection and, after 1820, received it in the face of opposition from Southern 
agricultural interests who bought imported manufactured producer and consumer goods and 
also linked their capacity to export, cotton especially, to U.S. willingness to import from 
Europe. The North, to succeed politically, needed an alliance with the West, which was in 
place until the Jackson Presidency, when his vetoes of legislation for Western improvements 
changed the balance of interests in favor of lower tariffs, ultimately the “free trade tariff” 
legislation of 1846 which generated average tariff rates of 25 percent in 1850 (calculated 
from tariff receipts as a percentage of the value of dutiable imports) as compared to 57 
percent in 1830. Higher tariff protection resumed after the Civil War, especially on 
manufactured goods, with average rates of about 40 percent between 1870 and 1910. 
Throughout this period there were tariffs on imported agricultural products such as wool and 
sugar, but rates averaged about 5 times as much for manufactured imports as for agricultural 
imports (Davis, Hughes, and McDougall 1965, Table 18-2, p. 327).   
Table 1 shows the evolution of U.S. protection as measured by customs duties as a 
percentage of the value of imports. This measure does not always provide a good indicator of 
the trade effects of tariffs, notably because a tariff so high as to shut off all imports generates 
no customs duties and so counts the same as free trade in calculating the numerator of this 
measure. Irwin (2007) reviews this and other shortcomings of that Table 1 indicator, and 
estimates a Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) that takes into account the effect of a tariff on 
imported quantities and the fact that the distortive effects of a tariff increase more than  
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proportionately with the height of the tariff.  His estimates indicate that for all merchandise 
trade, while customs duties as a percentage of all imports had fallen to 60 percent of the 1875 
level in 1931, the TRI in 1931 remained at 97 pecent of its 1875 level, i.e., that the reduction 
in the crude measure greatly overstates the extent of liberalization. But between 1931 and 
1960 the TRI fell faster than the crude measure and by 1960 the extent of overall trade 
liberalization between 1875 and 1960 was about the same for both measures. That is,  by 
either measure, the restrictivenes of tariffs in the post-World War II period was about one-
fourth the level of the late nineteenth century (Irwin 2007, Table 2). 
Because the United States has always been a net exporter of agricultural goods, and 
imported manufactured goods are used directly and in the production of inputs used in 
farming, the tariff structure effectively taxed agriculture throughout the nineteenth century. 
The estimates of Irwin (2006) indicate that for the 1870-1900 period, an average 30 percent 
protection on imported goods (duties as a percentage of all import values including duty-free 
imports) generated a net subsidy to import-competing manufacturers of 15 percent and a net 
tax on agriculture (and other exporters) of about 11 percent.
6   
This situation was reversed by increasing protection (through both import restrictions 
and domestic support) of agriculture after 1920. Import duties on wheat, maize, wool, sugar, 
and meat were raised sharply in “emergency” legislation of 1921 and the Tariff Act of 1922 
when “the representatives of the agricultural states had committed themselves to a policy of 
high and even ruthless protection” (Taussig 1931, pp. 452-53). At the same time, imports of 
many manufactured products used in farming were made duty-free.
7 After 1910, U.S. 
manufacturing became sufficiently export-oriented itself as not to be the strong political force 
for protection it once was, and after World War II protection of manufacturing steadily 
declined to the point that by 2000 import duties as a percentage of aggregate import value had 
declined to 1.6 percent (albeit with additional signficant protection of politically sensitive 
sectors such as textiles through non-tariff barriers). Tariffs on agricultural products were also 
reduced but protection from imports increased due to quantitative restrictions. In short, 
between the broad periods of 1820-1900 and 1930-2000 there was a substantial turnaround in 
                                                 
6 Irwin’s estimate of a net subsidy rate of 15 pecent is less than the tariff protection rate of 30 percent primarily 
because of the effect of higher import-competing goods in increasing costs of nontraded goods. 
7 It was such political successes of agriculture in tariff legislation that led H.L. Mencken to pillory farmers in 
one of his famous diatribes: “Has anyone heard of a farmer practising or advocating any political idea that was 
not absolutely self-seeking – that was not, in fact, deliberately designed to loot the rest of us to his gain? 
…There has never been a time, in good seasons or bad, when his hand were not itching for more…One might 
almost argue that the chief, and perhaps even only aim of legislation in These States is to succor and secure the 
farmer.” (Mencken 1958, pp. 158-60).  
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manufacturing as compared to agricultural import protection. However, it was apparent 
already in the 1920s that too much agricultural production was exported to make import 
protection effective in alleviating farmers’ losses in the post-World War I price plunge, and 
this changed the focus of farm policy to other measures. 
Overall, the protection of agricultural products relative to merchandise in general 
continued to increase over the last fifty years. The rates of import protection of both sectors 
were equal in the late 1950s and 1960s, but the protection of manufacturing has since fallen 
faster than assistance to agriculture. It should be noted however, comparing market-distorting 
agricultural protection with merchandise tariff rates has become decreasingly relevant in 
capturing the main U.S. import protection elements in either agriculture or manufacturing, 
because in agriculture and in industries such as steel, automobiles, and textiles, the more 
important distortions of international trade have become quantitative restrictions, often in the 
form of “volutary restraint” agreements between the United States and exporting countries. 
More economically relevant measures compare internal U.S. prices with international prices 
for the same goods, as discussed below. Nonetheless, the picture remains essentially the same 
– that governmental action to assist agriculture is increasing in impact as compared to action 
to protect manufacturing. 
 
Export subsidy measures 
An indicator of the role of export subsidies can be obtained from the value of subsidies paid 
per unit quantity of exports. In the U.S. these have been most significant for wheat, as noted 
above. Subsidies were as high as $1.3 billion for exported wheat in 1993 under the Export 
Enhancement Program. The subsidies were targeted to particular sales, however, and not 
available for all exports. This raised questions about their efficacy in actually increasing the 
quantity exported. By focusing subsidy funding on particular sales, the government’s 
expenditures were made more effective at increasing those targeted sales. Subsidized wheat 
received payment of as high as $43 per tonne in 1991. But at the same time large sales to 
other importers, notably Japan, were not subsidized at all.  
Because of the targeted nature of the subsidies, the proper measurement of the 
subsidy, not to mention its effects on net exports, is difficult to nail down (as is the effects of 
the wheat export embargoes of the 1970s).
8 The USDA budget provides information on the 
range of export promotion activities. In FY2005 as in the prior few years there were no 
                                                 
8 For estimates of effects of U.S. wheat export subsidies, see Gardner (1996). On the effects of grain export 
embargoes, see USDA (1986).  
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export subsidies under the EEP and also none under the more recent Dairy Export 
Enhancement Program. A total of $2.2 billion was spent on USDA’s Foreign Agriculture 
Service (FAS) programs, but $1.7 billion of this was on food aid programs. Market 
development programs and export credit guarantees are export promotion activities that also 
have features making them similar to export subsidies. In FY2005, FAS spent $184 million 
on market development programs such as sending teams abroad to make the case for US 
commodities, and on informational campaigns in the US and abroad. Export Credit 
Guarantees covered $2.6 billion in sales during FY2005 (at a budgetary cost of $137 million, 
which is a rough indicator of the subsidy element of the program). In response to a WTO 
dispute resolution panel in 2005, the U.S. has eliminated some high-risk countries from the 
guarantees and made other changes “intended to remove any long-term subsidy component of 
the program” (USDA 2006, p. 38). Unlike import restrictions, whose effects can be estimated 
by comparing internal and world reference prices because they are focused on a few 
commodities and create big effects, these export programs are spread so thinly across many 
commodities that it would not be credible to attribute to them any observed elevation in U.S. 
commodity prices relative to foreign prices for the same commodities. What makes more 
sense is to treat these expenditures together with domestic programs as elements of overall 
non-product-specific support, following OECD practice. 
 
 
Direct support of producers through commodity programs 
 
Payments to producers have been a central element in US agricultural policy since the first 
New Deal programs of 1933. Figure 2 shows payments in billions of US$ in real terms using 
the GDP deflator with 2000 = 100. For comparison, the figure also shows the total level of 
spending on “commodity stabilization and support” as measured by the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget. The spending levels are higher than payments prior to 1990 
because much of the spending was for removing products from the market using stockpiling 
programs, purchases for sale to schools and other food assistance, or subsidized sales abroad. 
In recent years, spending has been overwhelmingly dominated by direct payments to 
producers.
9  
                                                 
9 The spike in spending relative to payments in 2000 is an artifact of government budgetary spending being 
reported on a Fiscal Year (October-September) basis while payments to farmers are reported on a calendar year 
basis. In 2000, an election year, Congress rushed to get payments to farmers that would normally have gone out 
after October 1, before October 1, and this resulted in payments that would normally have occurred in two fiscal 
years occurring in one calendar year.  
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  Summarizing the effects of U.S. direct support programs is difficult because of the 
variety of policy instruments used and their evolution towards being increasingly decoupled 
from production decisions over time. Throughout the 1950s, the price suppport loan rates at 
which farmer could forfeit basic commodities to the CCC remained a primary policy 
instrument, and were reinforced by payments for idling land. By the 1960s, lower loan rates 
and direct payments to reduce forfietures at a supported price entered the policy arsenal. In 
the 1970s, the direct payments were further institutionalized in the form of “target prices” and 
payment to farmers of  a “deficiency payment” when the price of basic crops they produced 
fell below the target. By the 1980s, deficiency payments were being made only on 85 precent 
of a farmer’s base acreage, and for a historical level of “program yields.” Thus deficiency 
payments came to be somewhat decoupled from production decisions, although the specific 
basic crop for which payments were received had to be grown on the corresponding base 
acreage. Farmers also had to comply with annual acreae reduction requirements to be eligible 
for the deficiency payments. Annual acrege reductions idled an average of 46 million acres 
during 1983-1988 as world agricultural prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, then fell to much 
lower levels.  
 
Income support in the 1996 and 2002 Acts 
The most important change in the 1996 Farm Act was its Title 1, the Agricultural Market 
Transition Act (AMTA). With rising world prices for the U.S. farm commodities in 1995 and 
1996, AMTA replaced target prices, deficiency payments, and annual acreage set-asides for 
wheat, rice, feed grains, and cotton by a scheme of fixed “production flexibility” payments. 
The payments were based on amounts farmers received, or would have received if they had 
participated, in the pre-1996 deficiency payment program. The amount of the payment was 
independent of prices and was fixed by each farm’s production history. It could not be 
increased or decreased by changes in the farm’s acreage or yield of the program crops, while 
the program allowed farmers to plant a wide range of crops on base acreage (the reasons for 
the “production flexibility” label). The production flexibility payments were in this sense 
further decoupled from both prices and production, although payments were not divorced 
from all production decisions in that producers lost payments if they increased plantings of 
non-supported fruits or vegetables or they left farming completely. The aggregate of 
payments was scheduled to decline from about $6 billion annually in 1996 and 1997 to $4 
billion in 2002. AMTA payments constituted the bulk of projected commodity support in  
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1996, and the projections were for substantially less government spending on commodity 
programs than had occurred before 1995, as Figure 3 shows. 
 
The 2002 Act 
Within a year after the 1996 Act was introduced, commodity prices had begun to fall 
substantially. With the 1998 crops it became clear that prices were likely to remain at low 
levels for some time. The Asian financial crisis and China’s lack of an expected increase in 
imports weakened world demand and hence U.S. exports and prices. These low prices 
triggered two policy responses, one automatically and one through Congressional response. 
The automatic response came through the “marketing loan” program. This program was 
introduced in 1990 to replace the former loan rate program of supported market prices 
through forfeitures of commodities at an established “loan rate” price. The forfieture program 
had created a market price floor at the loan-rate price (because farmers could always get that 
price through the loan program). To keep this program from resulting in the government 
accumulating unwanted stocks of commodities, loan-rate prices were mostly kept below 
actual average prices after the 1960s. The marketing loan program precluded stock 
accumulation altogether by having the government not actually acquire grain but instead offer 
farmers a “loan deficiency payment” equal to the difference between the policy-determined 
loan-rate price (which varied from county to county) and the local county price. Because the 
loan-rate prices were set below average prices, hardly any loan deficiency payments were 
made during 1990-1997. But by 1998 commodity prices fell below loan-rate levels 
sufficiently to trigger $500 million in loan deficiency payments. Unlike the target-price-
related deficiency payments paid on a historically fixed level of output, the loan deficiency 
payments are made on all of current output. In Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, and 2001 these 
payments rose to $3.4, $6.4, and $5.3 billion, respectively, as all the grains, cotton, and rice 
experienced continuing historically low market price levels. 
The Congressional response to these low prices was to enact emergency “market loss 
assistance” programs in each of the years 1998-2001. These programs provided an average of 
$4.8 billion annually for those four years, added proportionally to each farmer’s production 
flexibility payments (in most cases doubling them during 1999-2001).  
These two added sources of spending are the main factors that account for the huge 
expansion of commodity program spending during 1998-2001, as compared to the levels  
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anticipated in 1996, shown in Figure 3. Instead of the roughly $6 billion annually that had 
been expected, actual spending averaged over $20 billion in those years. 
By 2001 it was clear that Congress was sufficiently dissatisfied with the political 
wrangling involved with annual emergency legislation that more permanent revision of the 
1996 Act would be legislated. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 provided 
for additional spending on farm programs of more than $50 billion over and above projected 
“baseline” spending if the 1996 Act had been continued. This increase was possible because 
at that time the U.S. budget was in surplus and was projected to continue in surplus, and 
because farm commodity producers had sufficient political power to defeat competitors for 
the funds available. This expanded commitment is the most significant, and to some most 
shocking, aspect of the 2002 Act.
10 
In addition to the issue of spending levels, the 2002 Act addressed structural issues in 
the form and scope of farm subsidies. Some farm groups, mainly centered in Great Plains 
wheat growing, wanted to return to supply management, in order to reduce production and 
increase commodity prices. Environmental groups pushed to have a substantial part of the 
new spending allocated to conservation and environment-improving programs. The 
legislation as enacted continued the fixed production flexibility payments from 1996 
(renamed fixed direct payments). Supply management was rejected but a new 
“Countercyclical Payment Program” was added to provide payments that rise or fall inversely 
with market prices (although the quantity base for payments remained fixed, with an option 
for one-time updating to 2002, for each farmer). This amounted basically to a re-institution of 
pre-1996 deficiency payments, but without annual acreage reduction set-aside requirements 
and with farmers retaining the planting flexibility introduced in 1996. In addition, earlier 
production quotas for peanuts were replaced with strengthened support programs similar to 
the other program crops and a new program of direct support payments for milk was added. 
Conservation and environmental programs ended up with a substantial share of the new 
spending, but not as much as the proponents of these programs had argued for. 
                                                 
10 A Washington Post editorial termed the bill “The Mother of All Pork.”  Business Week magazine opined: “It’s 
a dreadful piece of legislation – bad for most farmers, bad for consumers, and horrendous for taxpayers” (May 
7, 2002). The New York Times editorialized against the Act on several occasions, notably in one entitle “The 
Hypocrisy of Farm Subsidies” (December 1, 2002).    
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the innovations of the Act 
would cost an average of $8.0 billion over the ten Fiscal Years 2002-11.
11 Of this, $4.5 
billion were for direct payments to farmers under either the fixed payments or the mandated 
new Countercyclical Payment Program. In addition were estimated 10-year spending 
increases of $0.5 billion in marketing loans and loan deficiency payments, $0.5 billion for the 
new peanut program, $160 million for the new dairy program, and $43 million for increasing 
support in the sugar program, partly offset by savings projected at $26 million from 
tightening payment limitation slightly, for a total of a $5.7 billion average annual spending 
increase for all commodity programs (Title I of the Act). New initiatives in the Conservation 
Reserve Program and the Wetlands Reserve Program (both long-term paid land-idling 
programs that have enrolled a total of over 30 million acres since 1990), as well as the 
Environmental Quality Improvement Program, the Farmland Protection Program, and a new 
Conservation Security Program were projected to cost $1.3 billion annually over ten years 
(FAPRI 2002a). The expanded costs of these programs consisted mostly of payment made to 
farmers to encourage the use of soil conservation or water quality improvement practices. 
Some of the practices reduce production, such as replacing cultivated crops near streams or 
lakes with “filter strips” of grass in the Conservation or Wetlands Reserve Program. Other 
“working lands” programs are roughly neutral with respect to production or even increase 
production, such as Farmland Protection Program payments to farmers in exchange for their 
maintaining land in farming rather than selling it for commercial development. 
Apendix Table 3 shows details by program of spending on farm support. Total outlays 
in FY 2003 and 2004 were lower than projected because commodity prices higher than had 
been projected resulted in less spending than had been forecast on countercyclical payments 
and loan deficiency payments, both of which are lower the higher are commodity prices. But 
in FY2005 these payments increased as commodity prices fell. 
 
Overall summary of market-distorting support 
 
Table 2(a) shows the NRAs for key agricultural products, which are partly based on the 
OECD’s producer support estimates for 1986-07, and the author’s use of their method back to 
1955. This measure of NRAs excludes the deficiency, production flexibility and fixed direct 
payments, and the market loss assistance and countercyclical payments. These various 
                                                 
11 Ten-year projected spending was estimated in accordance with Congressional budgetary procedures, even 
though the Act only authorized programs for the six years 2002-07. The “baseline budget scoring” assumption is 
that those programs will be reauthorized to cover the ten-year period.  
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support payments have been at the heart of U.S. farm policies, as described above, but have 
become increasingly “decoupled” from producion decisions and arguably can now be 
concluded to have minimal or at least small effects on production or trade (see the Appendix 
for further discussion).
12 The main policies included in the NRAs in Table 2(a) are: import 
protection, most notably for sugar, but also for dairy products and meats; export subsidies, 
most notably the Export Enhancement Program and earlier export subsidies for wheat, but 
also affecting rice and poultry in some years; and the various loan-related payments to 
producers that a producer can increase by increasing output, which are closest to a classical 
production subsidy. Plotting these data separately for exported products and for imported 
products that compete with US products shows somewhat higher rates of assistance for 
importables (Figure 4(a)). Given the dominance of exportables in overall US production, its 
line in Figure 4(a) is close to the line for all covered products.  
The NRAs vary greatly across commodities, as summarized in the dispersion measure 
shown in the 2
nd to last row of Table 2(a), and even more so if the other products that get 
negligible support are considered (the latter accounting in aggregate for one-third of the value 
of U.S. agricultural production at undistorted prices, see bottom row of Table 2(a)).  
Appendix Table 4 describes support through various government payments (including 
those excluded from Table 2(a) which we term “decoupled”) for the top 25 commodities, 
accounting for 91 percent of the U.S. farm value of production in 2004. Overall, commodities 
accounting for 42 percent of production received significant support, with payments 
amounting to 6.9 percent of the value of production in 2004. Yet 14 of the top 25 
commodities, and a total of 58 percent of the value of production, received no significant 
support. Appendix Table 5 shows a broader picture of U.S. federal government activity in 
support of agriculture. In addition to the commodity programs there are conservation 
programs, export programs, governmentally underwritten loan programs for farmers, crop 
insurance, research funding, and marketing and regulatory programs. These additional 
activities have a price tag of $15 billion in 2005.
13 The sum of $34.1 billion for FY 2005 
                                                 
12 That argument is harder to make for the 1980s when these payments were tied to significant annual land 
idling requirements and it ignores wealth effects, insurance effects, and remaining production restrictions, as 
discussed in the Appendix. Whether any of thes effects are quantitatively important is an empirical question. 
While impossible to estimate with precision from the data available, the analysis to date suggests these effects 
are small.     
13 “Price tag” is a vague term and is used because the figures shown in Appendix Table 5 are not all derived 
from a consistent set of U.S. budgetary concepts. Most notably, the export credit guarantees are not the 
expenditures of the government on these guarantees; rather they are the value of loans guaranteed. Unless there 
are defaults on these loans (funds borrowed by foreign importers to buy U.S. exports are not repaid to the U.S.  
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Canada remained a British colony during the early period of U.S. trade policy, and did not 
introduce substantial tariff protection of manufacturing until the 1870s, and then at less than 
the U.S. levels (Fowke 1946, Ch. 10). Agricultural protection became important earlier, 
notably with wheat import tariffs directly against U.S. exports (and U.S. duties levied on 
Canadian grain exports). The signficance of particular policy steps has been debated, but a 
convincing case can be made that “The tariff (of 1843) was a true break in the old colonial 
system, and was brought about, not by capitalists seeking to establish new industries, but by 
pioneer farmers trying to exclude outsiders from the local markets” (Jones 1941, p. 537). 
Thus, while attempts to measure the relative protection of manufacturing and agriculture 
comparable to those cited above by Irwin for the United State for the nineteenth century are 
not available for Canada, it seems clear that agriculture was never implicitly taxed in Canada 
the way it was in the U.S. (or in Australia and New Zealand – see Anderson et al. 2008).   
With respect to the context of agricultural support, Canadian agriculture varies 
substantially from east to west in cropping patterns and size of farms, in ways roughly 
parallel to corresponding U.S. areas south of the border. In those parallel areas there are many 
similarities, notably between the Prairie provinces and the Northern Plains. However, the 
history of policy and current practices in the two countries are quite distinct in several 
respects. 
In the Great Depression of the 1930s, Canadian farmers were hit as hard as in the 
U.S., in both countries with particular severity in the Prairies. The Canadian government 
provided some debt relief through the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act of 1935, but Canada 
did not introduce an integrated set of programs or make substantial income transfers to 
farmers as the New Deal did in the U.S. Indeed it is arguable that at that time and still to the 
present day, while a series of ad hoc programs have been implemented Canada has no 
comprehensive farm policy comparable to the omnibus U.S. farm bills. This is attributable at 
least in part to Canada’s more decentralized political system, under which many policies are 
Provincial rather the Federal, notably in the marketing area where Provinces have set up 
                                                                                                                                                        
lenders) the actual outlays on these programs is negligible.  In fact, defaults are rare. In U.S. budgetary parlance, 
the value of loans guaranteed is the “program level”, and this is what the USDA budget summary shows.  
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marketing legislation for fruits and animal products going back to 1926 (see Schmitz, Furtan, 
and Baylis 2002, Ch. 2).  
The first major federal support of the U.S. type was provided under the Agricultural 
Stabilization Act of 1958. This program guaranteed producers 80 percent of the average price 
over the previous ten years, by means of payments from the federal government. Only small 
payments were made, and in 1975 the payment trigger was raised to 90 percent of a five-year 
moving average price and a mechanism was introduced for compensating farmers for rapid 
increases in cash costs of production, which “indicated the Canadian Government’s 
continuing commitment to ensuring short-term solvency in agriculture” (OECD 1978, p. 29). 
Canada’s agricultural policies for grains and oilseeds have followed to an extent a 
path similar in some respects to those of the United States, but with less reliance on crop 
supply management through acreage controls and with more reliance on collective marketing 
most notably through the Canadian Wheat Board. The CWB has a legal monopoly on the 
sales of Canadian wheat and barley into foreign markets -- all exports as well as sales of 
wheat to domestic millers of flour must be sold through that agency. Farmers then get a 
pooled price depending on the receipts the CWB is able to earn from the exported and 
domestically sold commodities. The monopoly powers of the CWB have been challenged in 
Canadian courts, much as the original U.S. programs of the 1930s were in the U.S. courts, on 
constitutional grounds. In a case brought in 1994, a group of barley growers sued the CWB, 
arguing that it “breached the rights of individual farmers guaranteed under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (Schmitz and Furtan 2000, p. 145). The plaintiffs’ plea was 
rejected (and following Canadian law they had to pay court costs of the defendants – the 
government of Canada).  
The year 1995 was a watershed in that, under pressure because of federal budgetary 
deficits and the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement’s disciplines on export subsidies, 
transportation subsidies under the Western Grain Transportation Act were ended. These had 
cost an average of about $(US)12 per tonne of grain and their elimination was estimated to 
have saved the federal government about $(US) 400 million in 1995. 
With respect to income support for producers, Canada has undertaken far-reaching 
experimentation in its series of grain programs over the last 30 years. The Western Grains 
Stabilization Program (WGSP), initially enacted in 1976, made payments from a fund partly 
financed by growers when their aggregate cash receipts from grains fell below a 5-year  
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moving average. After accumulating large deficits without providing satisfactory income 
protection to producers, the WGSP was abandoned.  
The Farm Income Protection Act of 1991 marked an important turning point in 
Canada’s approach to farm support in crop production, moving from policies aimed at 
particular commodities toward a whole-farm approach. The 1991 Act introduced the Gross 
Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) and the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA). 
These programs were tuned to each producer’s situation, with GRIP making crop-specific 
payments to producers when their production times the market-wide average market price fell 
below that producer’s established average yield times a “target” price. The program was 
packaged as insurance in that each producer paid a premium for this coverage (but about two-
thirds of the premium cost was paid by a combination of provincial and federal funds).  
GRIP combined features of the U.S. deficiency payment and subsidized crop 
insurance programs, and its comprehensive approach has attractive features. But it proved to 
have too little political support from farmers to justify its budgetary costs in the belt-
tightening environment of the mid-1990s, and GRIP expired after 1995. NISA, a more 
broadly conceived (avoiding support of specific commodities) and less costly program, 
continued until another decade. It is essentially a subsidized savings account into which 
producers can contribute 2 percent of the value of qualifying grain sales, to be matched by 1 
percent each from provincial and federal governments. The producer can withdraw funds 
from the account if either annual farm operating income or family income falls below 
established triggers (see Huff (no date) and Gray and Smith (1997) for further discussion).  
In 1998 Canada introduced the Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA) 
program. Under that program, funded 60 percent by federal and 40 percent by provincial 
governments, anyone who files income tax returns as a farmer can get an indemnity payment 
if their gross returns fall below 70 percent of the similarly calculated returns over the average 
of the three preceding years (Edelman 1999; Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis 2002). In 2001, the 
Canadian Farm Income Program (CFIP) replaced AIDA. The experimental nature of farm 
income support has been intensified since 2004 with the phasing out of NISA and AIDA, and 
replacement with new and ad hoc programs.  
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) Program, introduced in 
2003/04, combines insurance and income support features. It makes payments to producers 
when a farmer’s “production margin” falls below the “reference margin” for the farm, 
calculated from previous years’ experience. The reference margin is a measure of returns  
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minus costs that counts fewer expense items than under previous programs, because 
“Experience with previous farm programs such as the CFIP indicated that including a high 
number of allowable expenses often resulted in reference margins being low and in many 
case negative. This often resulted in producers being ineligible for benefits.” (Agriculture and 
Agri-Food Canada 2006).  
In response to the losses resulting from the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) crisis which devastated the beef export business, and as a “bridge” to the CAIS 
Program, the Transitional Income Support Program was introduced in 2004 to assist both 
livestock and grain producers. This program together with more liberal payouts under the 
CAIS raised the costs of farm support in 2003-05 as compared to earlier years. In 2006 the 
government introduced payments under the Grains and Oilseeds Program (GOPP) that will 
further increase support.  
The 21
st century programs are organized and marketed under the Agricultural Policy 
Framework, which the Government of Canada and the provinces/territories agreed upon in 
late 2003 to coordinate agricultural policy under five headings: Business Risk Management, 
Environment, Food Safety and Quality, Innovation, and Renewal (see Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada 2005). The latter two areas comprehend what are traditionally described as rural 
development and research/extension programs. Business Risk Management covers CAIS and 
the more recent payment programs. All of the programs have notable differences in funding 
and delivery from province to province.  
Unlike for grains, Canada has maintained supply management programs with strong 
control measures for dairy, poultry, and eggs. This is in sharp contrast to the U.S. where 
supply management in livestock is entirely absent.
14 Canada’s supply management history 
grew out of Provincial marketing board which had become well established by the 1960s 
(Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis 2002 Ch. 9). The Canadian Dairy Commission, created in 1966, 
introduced supply management ideas which culminated in market-share quotas, under which 
a farmer must have an established quota in order to sell milk. Import quotas (under the 
Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement converted to tariff-rate quotas) keep milk from 
entering Canada at the high domestic price established for milk sold at retail, while milk for 
processed dairy products is sold at lower prices to be competitive in world markets. Similar 
but less complex supply management programs exist for broilers (chickens), eggs, and 
turkeys.  
                                                 
14 In the original programs of the 1930s there were U.S. supply control efforts in livestock, but the only 




Overall summary of market-distorting support 
 
Table 2(b) shows the NRAs for key agricultural products, which again are partly based on the 
OECD’s producer support estimates for 1979-07, and the author’s use of their method back to 
1961. These products cover between 75 and 85 pecent of Canadian agriculture. The average 
NRA for those covered products was around 8 percent up to the mid-1970s, rose to 28.6 
pecent during the export price war period of 1985-89, but has since come back to around 12 
percent. The dispersion in NRAs across the product range also rose substantially up to the 
mid-1980s and has more than halved since then. As usual, the estimated NRA for importables 
is well above that of exportables according to our classification based on trade status – and 
well above the average importables NRA for the U.S.  
 
Agricultural relative to non-agricultural support 
 
To get a more-complete picture of the policy distortions to farmer incentives in North 
America, we first provide ‘guesstimates’ of the NRAs for non-covered products (a weighted 
average across exportables, import-competing products and nontradables), we then add non-
product-specific support such as input subsidies, and also add what we term “decoupled 
support” as measured by certain OECD categories of its Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) 
over the past 3 decades. As well, we compare the NRA for tradable farm products (including 
non-product-specific support but not decoupled payments) with the NRA for non-agricultural 
tradables by calculating a Relative Rate of Assistance. These are summarized in Table 3. 
  Input subsidies and other non-product-specific assistance is of non-trivial importance 
to the overall NRA for agriculture in North America as compared with the rest of the world, 
adding between one-quarter and one-third to the sectoral NRA in the U.S and only slightly 
less in Canada. In this category are included payments based on input use (OECD E1) and 
miscellaneous payments (OECD H).   
Of even more importance is what we have termed as ‘decoupled’ payments, which are 
assumed to encourage production less than market price support policies. Following certain 
OECD categories, we include here not only the various commodity income support payments 
described above as increasingly decoupled from prices and production over time, but also 
payments made for long-term acreage idling under programs such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program and also subsidies for crop insurance and ad hoc annual disaster payments  
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(see note to Table 3 for the OECD categories included).
15 As can be seen from Table 3(a) and 
Figure 5(a), those decoupled payments nearly doubled the NRA for the U.S. in the mid-
1980s, and added about one-third in the 1990s and the present decade. For Canada such 
‘decoupled’ payments have been somewhat less important although still non-trivial (Table 
3(b) and Figure 5(b)).  
As pointed out above, it is difficult to summarize the effects of U.S. support programs 
because of the variety of policy instruments used. Although any estimate is conjectural, the 
set of most-reasonable estimates indicate that in the 1999-2005 period the marketing loan 
program has increased the U.S. output of grains and soybeans by about 2 percent, the direct 
payment program, including the 2002 Act’s changes, about 1 percent, and crop insurance 
subsidies by 1+ percent, for a total effect of 4 to 5 percent more of these commodities being 
produced than would have been the case in the absence of commodity support programs. The 
long-run consequences (on conservation, agricultural research, technology adoption) of 
commodity support policies are a quite different matter not considered here. 
Looking at the levels of border protection and domestic support payments themselves, 
overall government support for farmers in the U.S. rose in the decade or so from the mid-
1970s (having fallen in the two decades prior to that). It has since fallen back slightly even 
when decoupled payments are included, although the level was as nearly as high during the 
period of low world agricultural prices during 2000-2004 as it was when prices were low in 
the late 1980s (see Table 3). It dropped substantially after 2005 as international food prices 
spiked, but this does not represent a change in policy so much as the countercyclical design 
of some US payments and a reduced need to support farmers because of higher prices. 
Support for farmers in Canada too rose steeply in the decade or so from the mid-1970s, but 
has since fallen back even more than in the U.S. especially when decoupled payments are 
                                                 
15 Neither our categories “non-product specific” nor “decoupled” correspond directly to uses of these terms in 
WTO domestic support notifications or as has occurred in dispute settlement arguments. To illustrate, the NPS 
for 1986-2007 herein includes diesel fuel tax exemptions not reported by the US to the WTO under the URAA 
category of NPS, while it excludes crop and revenue insurance subsidies that are reported as WTO NPS support. 
The “decoupled” category herein includes not only the “decoupled income support” as defined in URAA Annex 
2 as WTO Green Box (which is how the US reports its fixed direct payments); also included in this category is 
the countercyclical payments that the US reports as NPS. Subtleties in distinguishing between these categories 
of payments are discussed in the Appendix and both classifications are being subject to WTO dispute settlement 
litegation. The decoupled support herein also includes conservation payments  (both for long-term land-idling 
and working lands) that are reported to the WTO by the U.S. as green box and the crop and revenue insurance 
subsidies reported to the WTO as NPS support. The use of these terms herein also differs from common 
classifications in U.S. farm bill discussions and budgets that, for example, often clearly separate commodity 
support from conservation expenditures.  
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taken into account. As in the U.S., the NRA for Canada dropped substantially after the early 
2000s as international food prices rose. 
By contrast, assistance to producers of non-agricultural tradable goods has been lower 
than for farmers throughout this period, and has declined more than for the farm sector. 
Hence even leaving decoupled payments aside, the rate of assistance to producers of 
agricultural products relative to those producing non-agricultural goods is now considerably 
higher than in the early 1960s in the U.S., other than in the years of historically high 
international prices, namely 1995 and 2006-07 (Table 3(a) and Figure 6(a)). The 2008 Farm 
Bill left the existing support programs in place and created others that could raise 
expenditures even if agricultural prices remain higher than they generally were during 1990-
2006.
16 Assistance to Canada’s producers of non-agricultural tradable goods, too, has been 
lower than for farmers since the mid-1960s, and has declined more than for Canada’s farm 
sector and more than in the U.S. Hence the relative rate of assistance to the farmers became 
considerably higher in the 1980s than in earlier decades,  but in the 1990s it returned to levels 
similar to those in the U.S., again with the lowest levels being in the years of historically high 
international prices, namely 1995 and 2007 (Table 3(b) and Figure 6(b)). 
When expressed in real (constant 2000) dollars instead of percentage price wedges, 
the decine in border and domestic support recently is much less evident, because over time 
the value of the farm sector has been growing and the number of farmers shrinking. The peak 
real value of support in total dollars was higher in the latter 1980s than this decade, but when 
expressed on a per farmer basis it was even higher in 2000-04 (before international food 
prices rose) than in 1985-89. When the market price support compenent is expressed by 
product, the lion’s share in recent decades has gone to dairy and sugar, which receive more 
border protection than cotton and maize (Table 4).  
 
Consumer tax equivalents 
 
While much of the support for farmers worldwide comes from border measures, in the case of 
North America there are also large shares that come from non-product-specific meaures and 
from payments that are decoupled somewhat from production. Hence consumers there are not 
taxed to the same extent as producers are assisted – although taxpayers bear additional costs. 
And, because of the differing net trade status of each product, the weighted average of ad 
                                                 
16 See Orden, Blandford and Josling (2008) for discussion of the 2008 US Farm Act.  
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valorem consumer tax equivalents across all covered farm products differs also because 
consumption instead of production weights are used. There are also direct consumer subsidies 
in the U.S., notably through the food stamp program, and in some years for some products 
those direct subsidies more than offset the tax component of the trade measures used there to 
support producer prices, resulting in negative CTEs. The rises and falls in the degree of 
distortion on the consumption side of the market can be seen in Table 5.  
Part (b) of that table shows how trivial these transfers from or to food consumers in 
North America have been on a per capita basis. Even in Canada they amount to only $154 or 
less per capita per year. This, together with the free rider problem associated with collective 
action, helps explain why consumers in that region do not counter-lobby farmers over farm 
support programs. It also means the trade and national economic welfare effects of U.S. 
programs are less than programs delivering the same NRA for farmers in other countries but 
via trade measures which generate a CTE equal to the NRA.  
 
 
The Politics of U.S. and Canadian Policies 
 
 
Explaining the political forces behind U.S. and Canadian agricultural policies requires 
qualitative rather than quantitative analysis, but the contrasts between the political treatment 
of commodities within and between the two countries suggests several hypotheses. I will 
discuss the following: (1) historical legacies of commodity producer cooperation, (2) the 
importance of supply-chain participant cohesion, and the linkage of that with technological 
change, (3) the role of budgetary pressures, and (4) the inherent weakness of opposition to 
agricultural support. There are both economic and cultural factors lying behind each of 
these.
17 
The importance of a historical legacy of producer cooperation was emphasized by 
Olson (1985). He noted the traditional and continuing strength of the dairy industry and 
traced that back to the long-standing organization of producers in marketing cooperatives. 
His underlying point is that lobbying is a voluntary collective activity of precisely the kind 
highly susceptible to free-rider problems, that this is in fact the chief hurdle to an interest 
group obtaining subsidies, and that cooperative organizations have already solved this 
                                                 




problem sufficiently to permit effective lobbying. This hypothesis fits well with what would 
otherwise be perhaps the chief puzzle in Canadian as compared to U.S. agricultural support, 
namely why poultry has had a well entrenched support system via supply control and import 
protection in Canada but gets virtually nothing in the U.S. As Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis 
(2002) explain it, supply control measures grew out of cooperative activity in those 
commodities by provincial producer organizations. But there were no corresponding such 
poultry organizations in the U.S. 
Of course the efficacy of lobbying depends not only on getting organized to make 
one’s case, but also on the legislators’ listening and acting favorably. It is almost axiomatic 
that legislators have an interest in listening to their electorate, who hire and fire them. But a 
legislator cannot act in accord with the requests of all his or her constituents. Why do 
agricultural commodity interests get heard well in so many cases? Traditionally U.S. farmers 
were said to have a political advantage because of the structure of Congress, which has two 
Senators for every state, which means one representing each 300,000 residents of the 
Dakotas, Wyoming, and Montana and one for each 20 million residents of California. 
However, recent efforts at reform (such as taking payments away from producers who have 
over a million dollars in off-farm income) have been defeated in the House (where each 
Representative equally has about 600,000 resident constituents) as soundly as in the Senate.  
The general principal of representation is that a legislator whenever possible provides 
the constituents what they ask for. What confounds the efficacy of asking is competing 
constituents who ask for policies that conflict. A strength of cotton growers is that they 
present to the agriculture committees of Congress a unified position of the supply chain 
including growers, ginners, shippers, and millers. This has led to policies like the “step two” 
payments to cotton textile millers that compensate them for paying prices for cotton that 
exceed the low world prices that trigger payments to cotton growers (until stopped, to comply 
with a WTO ruling). Similarly a strength of the corn growers is that they have powerful 
agribusiness allies who support ethanol subsidies, and a former weakness of the grain 
producers was their asking for acreage control measures that restricted raw material supplies 
for such agribusiness (former because the 1996 Farm Act revoked the authority of the 
Secretary of Agriculture to administer annual acreage reduction programs that until the 1990s 
were a key feature of grains policy). Cross-commodity dispute is a related problem, arising, 
for example, on the part of fruit and vegetable growers left out of “decoupled” payment  
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programs. Similarly, a strength of sugar import restrictions politically is that high sugar prices 
have created a large market for corn-based sweeteners. 
Monetary contributions help in getting an interest group’s case listened to. Farmers 
are not notably profligate donors, but agricultural Political Action Committees (PACs) have 
been important in the U.S. Table 6 summarizes PAC donations to politicians or candidates 
reported during the 2006 election cycle (Nov. 2004 – Oct. 2006). These data are from the 
legally required reporting of PACs for donations over $100,000, and do not capture all 
political spending. The $6.7 million they donated may seem a lot, but there were 1,200 non-
agricultural PACs that spent over $100,000 in the U.S. during this period, and their aggregate 
spending was $800 million. The largest agricultural PAC, the Sugar Alliance, ranked 154
th of 
the 1,200. Agriculture’s share of the spending, 6.7/800 or just under 1 percent, is about the 
same as agriculture’s share of national GDP. Overall spending by PACs in the broad 
Standard Industrial Classification code for agriculture was $15 million, but the majority of 
this was from agribusiness firms, notably Deere, Deans Foods, the International Dairy Foods 
Association, Cargill, Tysons, Archer-Daniel-Midlands, Conagra, and Heinz Foods. These 
companies have interests that are often the same as the commodity producers’ interests, but 
not always, and what the agribusiness firms focus on in their lobbying is more typically their 
own specific issues of concern.  In short, it does not appear likely that money is the source of 
farmers’ exceptional political influence. 
Technical or other exogenous economic changes create diverse interests within a 
commodity group that can make policy-making aimed at benefiting the group as a whole 
unattractive to legislators. This happened in the most notable case of a formerly important 
commodity program that totally disappeared, the U.S. potato price support program. During 
1945-1950, the potato program became highly contentious and eventually died because the 
growing Western potato growers could produce profitably at lower prices than the support 
levels that prevailed, and saw their market potentially capped by restraints needed to control 
the costs of the support system (which then relied heavily on production control for the main 
supported commodities). Similarly the long-standing marketing order pricing systems for 
California oranges and lemons was ended in the 1990s, mainly because of within-industry 
disagreement about its operation; and differing interests of peanut and tobacco farmers with 
and without quotas to produce for the high-priced domestic market contributed to demise of 
these quota program earlier this decade.  
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One might expect consumer interests to oppose farm legislation that would increase 
food prices, but this has only rarely surfaced as a significant political force (the notable case 
being U.S. grain export embargoes of the 1970s). This lack of opposition seems to be 
associated with longstanding positive feelings that the general public has about farmers and 
farming. A broad-based source of resistance to agricultural support that has been effective is 
budgetary pressure at times when fiscal discipline is perceived to be a high priority. In both 
the 1985 and 1990 farm legislation, reductions in payments were enacted in order that farm 
bills could meet overall Congressional budget limits. The 1996 farm legislation was also 
designed to limit subsidy expenditures, but that budget discipline quickly broke down. 
As noted earlier, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 covering crops planted 
in 2002-2007 increased spending well above baseline levels from continuation of the 
legisltation it replaced. This Act was popular in Congress, having passed in the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 280 to 141 and in the Senate by 64 to 35. The Bush 
Administration did not raise serious objections and the President signed the bill in the 
presence of farm-group representatives with words of praise.
18 However, small-farm and 
environmental advocacy groups were unhappy that amendments failed that would have 
imposed more stringent payment limits on large farms, redirected some commodity program 
payments to conservation/environmental programs, and imposed various regulatory restraints 
on agribusiness. Outside the community of agricultural interests, the 2002 Act has been 
widely reviled, as mentioned earlier.
19 And just after the Act was passed, three western 
Provinces of Canada, along with a dozen Canadian farm groups, asked for $C1.3 billion to 
offset the effects of the new U.S. payments. Since that time, Canada has raised its payments 
to producers too, as herein described. 
 
 
Prospects for Reform 
 
 
                                                 
18 As a reminder that Presidents do not always accept what Congress delivers in support of agriculture, President 
Reagan in 1985 vetoed a farm bill on budgetary grounds, in the midst of the farm crisis of the 1980s.  Congress 
could not muster the two-thirds majorities needed to override the veto, so the President’s action was decisive.  
19 It is also notable that the more market-oriented members of Congress, even if they represent agricultural 
constituencies, opposed the bill.  Among the opponents were not only the House Republican leadership, but also 
members of the Agriculture Committee such as Boehmer (R-Ohio) and Dooley (D-California), who wrote a 
Washington Post opinion piece entitled “This Terrible Farm Bill” (May 2, 2002). Similarly strong opposition 




Both the United States and Canada have enacted agricultural support programs that have 
distorted their domestic commodity markets. Considering how similar the countries are in 
many respects, there are some notable differences between the policy approaches in the two 
countries in the choice of policy instruments. But the similarities are more fundamental, and 
the ones that bear on the prospects for reform are: (1) strong political resilience of support for 
farmers, (2) weak political expression of consumers’ interests, (3) trends toward less reliance 
on measures that seek to control prices in particular markets (via stockpiling, supply 
management, import tariffs), (4) trends toward more reliance on whole-farm income support 
(especially in Canada) and payments under commodity programs that are de-linked from 
current production (U.S.), (5) acceptance of multilateral liberalization of agricultural trade, 
but only with maintenance of protection for some producer interests, (6) modest increases in 
political influence of environmental protection, and (7) episodic political strength of taxpayer 
interests in cutting farm-support spending, under circumstances that give general budget 
reduction. The result of these forces and trends has been that real spending on agricultural 
support has not diminished over time even as the share of the agricultural sector in the overall 
economy has diminished greatly, while at the same time both countries have moved in the 
last fifteen years in the direction of reduced directly market-distorting policies. In the face of 
historically low commodity prices 1998-2002 the U.S. maintained policies that have 
forestalled output reductions that these low prices would otherwise have induced.  
What options does the preceding summary suggest for reform? First, the best 
prospects remain international negotiations, most notably the Doha Round. Given the failure 
of the Doha Round so far, this is perhaps a depressing conclusion. Nonetheless, it remains the 
case that the U.S. and Canada would sign on to such an agreement if it involved provisions 
that reform proponents could point to as offsetting gains in agricultural export markets. 
Second, there remain prospects that a combination of environmental/taxpayer interests could 
shift agricultural support spending toward public-good provision in ways that would be less 
market-distorting than are current policies.
20 Reforms in this direction were formulated and 
promoted by several organized coalitions of interests in preparation for the 2008 U.S. farm 
bill, mainly environmentalists, farmland preservationists, and internationally oriented 
agribusiness groups. Third, and not in the cards now but a possibility an economist (or at least 
one like me) can cling to is a resurrection of a general predisposition to economic liberalism, 
                                                 
20 Even if these policies were more market-distorting, as they could possibly become, they would more likely be 




as occurred in Australia and New Zealand (Anderson et al. 2008). It was not so long ago that 
this predisposition in North America served to limit the scope of market-distorting legislation 
considerably, and could again, as the recent Canadian legal debate on the Canadian Wheat 
Board’s authorities illustrates, despite its outcome. The ascent of free-market Republicans in 
the 1980s suggested this might be a real possibility for the U.S. But the policy salience of this 
strain of opinion has been thwarted by that party’s embrace of muscular nationalism, military 
internationalism and cultural conservatism. Similarly, the once-prominent advocacy of free-
trade Democrats has been swamped by the wave of industrial protectionism allied with anti-
trade prairie populism that party believes it needs to regain power.  
The prospects for each of the preceding openings to reform – a liberalizing WTO 
agreement, conservation/environmental pressures, and a resurgence of deregulatory policy 
dispositions – would be enhanced with the traditional economist’s recipe of compensating the 
losers from policy changes with nondistorting transfers. Direct Payments under the U.S. 1996 
and 2002 Farm Acts are a move in this direction, but what is really required are one-time 
payments, or “buy-outs.” U.S. policy has carried out three notable experiments in buy-outs 
since 1980: in dairy, peanuts and tobacco. The dairy buy-out (Dairy Production Termination 
Program) was implemented in 1986/87, at a time when milk surpluses were chronic. It was 
calculated that having dairy farmers agree to sell their herds and leave dairying would save 
budgetary outlays. Farmers made offers to the government stating a price per hundred pounds 
of milk producing capacity of their herds at which they would be willing to leave the 
business. Producers who participated had to sell all their female cattle and agree to remain out 
of dairy farming for five years, and attempts were made to ensure that cattle sold were 
slaughtered or exported and not sold to another dairy farm. The program was estimated to 
reduce U.S. milk production by about 7 percent in the short term but to have had no long-
term effect (Dixon, Susanto, and Berry 1991). The positive lesson is that buy-outs can be 
successfully implemented by USDA as a means of getting farmers to participate in policy 
reform.   
Buy-outs to permanently remove producers from certain commodity support 
programs have been undertaken for peanuts and tobacco since 2000. The 2002 Farm Act 
authorized payments to peanut producers to buy their production quotas, which had well 
defined values under pre-existing programs. Premiums over market values of quota had to be 
paid, but again the approach was proven feasible. Similarly, tobacco quotas and its entire 
price support program were terminated in 2005. However, whether buyouts would be feasible  
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for commodities without production-limiting quotas or where program-created assets are not 
so precisely defined is questionable. An approximation to a buyout was in the minds of some 
proponents of production flexibility contract payments in the 1996 Farm Act. But this 
legislation did not formally end the pre-existing support structure and, in fact, did not end the 
support programs. Rather, the approach enabled additional payments to farmers. While 
students of the prospects for this approach remain cautious (see Orden 2006 and Orden, 
Blandford and Josling 2009), something like it coupled with changes of approach as outlined 
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 Figure 1: Farm household income as a persent of national household income, United States, 





Source: Gardner (2002, Figure 3.12) and USDA, Economic Research Service, Briefing 
Rooms (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/) 































































Source: Author’s compilation from the Congressional Budget Office, Washington DC.  
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Figure 3: CCC commodity program outlays, United States, 1980 to 2002 
 

























Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered 
agricultural products, United States and Canada,
a 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
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Import-competing products Exportables Total 
 
 
a Includes the NRAs shown in Table 2 and what we term as “non-product-specific” 
assistance, all of which is attributed to tradables. Non-product-specific for 1986-2007 
includes payments classified by OECD as based on input use (E1) and miscellaneous 
payments (H). The total line does not include what we term “decoupled” assistance. 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on authors’ spreadsheet.  
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to all agriculture without and with decoupled support,
a 
United States and Canada, 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 







































































































































































Decoupled support excluded Decoupled support included
 
a Decoupled support includes ‘direct payments’ in the years 1979-85. From 1986 those payments are 
specified to comprise the OECD’s items C (payments based on area planted/animal numbers), D 
(payments based on historical entitlements), F (payments based on input constraints) and G (payments 
based on overall farming income). And for 2005-07, those items replaced by similar but newly 
defined items C to E. The values of those payments are estimated by the OECD. Non-product specific 
support is also from OECD estimates as defined in the note to Figure 4 (see text for discussion). 
 Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on authors’ spreadsheet and OECD (2008 and 
earlier years).  
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Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to all non-agricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rate of assistance,
a United States and Canada, 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
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a The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) – 1]. 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on author’s spreadsheet.  
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 Manufactured Agricultural All   
 products products merchandise 
   
1821 47 47 43 
1830 64 62 57 
1840 21 00 18 
1850 27 3 25 
1860 19 2 18 
1870 46 47 50 
1880 39 6 29 
1890 41 8 30 
1900 40 15 28 
1910 29 9 21 
1920 7 2 6 
1930 18 8 15 
1940 15 7 13 
1950 9 2 6 
1960 na na 7 
1970 na na 7 
1980 na na 3 
1990 na na 3 
2000 na na 1.6 
 
Sources: Davis, Hughes, and McDougall (1965, p. 327) for manufactured and agricultural 
products, Carter (2006) for all merchandise.  
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Table 2:  Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, United States and Canada,
a 1955 to 2007  
(percent) 
(a) United States 
 
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Exportables  1.0 1.1 6.7 5.7 2.1 5.0  10.5 5.5 5.1 8.1 4.8 
Cotton  5.8  0.2 65.2 43.2  9.2 15.6 32.6 24.6 27.8 70.0 77.0 
Egg  na na na na  4.1  5.8  4.6  8.1  2.2  0.0  0.0 
Maize  0.0 1.4 2.4 3.4 0.4 2.6  10.4 0.6 4.8 7.0 6.6 
Poultry  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Rice  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6  15.6  38.8  20.1 7.8  52.7 2.2 
Sorghum  na na na na na  37.3  15.0  0.2  4.8  5.5  7.2 
Soybean  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 6.6  12.4 0.6 
Wheat  0.0  3.6 17.8 14.4  9.6 11.2 29.1 25.5  5.4  4.3  0.2 
Import-competing  products  8.8 9.4 9.4 6.6 9.8  21.1  25.2  19.9 9.5  17.5 8.9 
Barley  na na na na na na  61.9  59.6  4.8  5.3  3.2 
Beef  0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Milk  20.2 23.6 21.0 17.0 25.4 61.8 96.9 59.9 78.8 66.5 24.2 
Pigmeat  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sheepmeat  na na na na na  7.1  2.4  1.2  3.4  13.8  9.9 
Sugar  50.4 65.9  134.3 18.2 40.3  120.2  158.3 78.8 96.1  115.6 47.6 
Wool  na na na na na na  1.2  0.9  0.9  16.1  28.2 
Non-tradable  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Potato  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
             
All  covered  4.7 4.8 7.8 5.9 5.1  11.1  16.2  11.2 6.2  11.6 6.3 
   Domestic market support  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.9  2.3  0.4  2.2  3.6  1.0 
   Border market support  4.7  4.8  7.8  5.9  5.0  10.2  13.9  10.8  4.1  8.0  5.3 
Dispersion of NRA of covered products  17.3  23.1  46.6  15.7  14.6  39.8  55.3  27.6  31.4  38.4  23.3 





Table 2 (continued):  Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, United States and Canada,




  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Exportables  2.5 2.4 2.2 2.8 4.3 8.2 2.4 1.4 1.4 0.4 
Barley  2.0 2.0 2.0 5.8 8.0  10.4 2.5 1.4 2.8 1.0 
Beef  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 2.6 4.0 3.9 nap nap nap 
Peas  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pigmeat  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.3 5.1 3.8 2.0 0.4 
Rapeseed  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Soybean  nap nap nap nap nap 2.8  0.4 0.5 1.2  0.3 
Wheat  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 5.3  10.4 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.2 
Import-competing  products  15.7 12.0 12.2 32.3 47.2 53.1 44.0 41.3 49.1 46.9 
Beef  nap nap nap nap nap nap nap 2.0 1.8  0.7 
Egg  na  na  na  na 41.1 30.1 33.1 27.7 10.6 64.7 
Maize  4.9 4.7 3.5 2.3 2.0  12.8 2.5 3.3 8.7 2.9 
Milk  34.4  34.4  34.4 162.8 307.2 314.2 182.6 109.4 125.9  94.4 
Poultry  17.0 17.8 33.5 24.4 23.3 23.7 25.2  2.7  2.6  6.9 
Soybean  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 nap nap nap nap nap 
Sugar  na na na na  32.5  79.5  31.0  17.7 na na 
Non-tradables   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Potato  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
            
All  covered  8.7  7.2  7.0 16.0 22.5 28.6 20.8 12.3 13.5 11.4 
      Domestic  market  support  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5  13.2 4.1 1.9 1.4 0.4 
      Border  market  support  8.7  7.2  7.0 15.9 22.1 15.4 16.6 10.4 12.1 11.0 
Dispersion  of  NRA  of  covered  products  11.1 11.0 13.8 47.5 84.5 87.2 50.1 31.1 35.9 32.5 
%  coverage  at  undistorted  prices  71 76 79 84 86 83 81 79 76 76 
a The main U.S. policies included are import protection; export subsidies; and the various loan-rate-related price support and payments to producers. Excludes deficiency, 
production flexibility and fixed direct payments, and the market loss assistance and countercyclical payments (see text for discussion). Weighted averages use weights based 
on the unassisted value of production. Dispersion is the standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean.  
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on author’s spreadsheet. Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, United States and Canada,
a 1955 to 2007 
(percent) 
(a) United States 
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Covered products  4.7  4.8  7.8  5.9  5.1 11.1 16.2 11.2  6.2 11.6  6.3 
Non-covered products  8.0  7.7  6.0  5.0 4.7 6.6  10.9 8.4 8.5 9.6 5.4 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  5.8  5.8  7.2 5.6 5.0 9.7  14.4 10.2  7.0 10.9  5.2 
   All importables  8.6  8.9  8.5  6.1  8.4 16.9 20.9 16.4  9.1 15.0  8.7 
   All exportables  2.7  2.7  6.5  5.5 2.6 5.3  10.6 6.2 5.8 8.4 4.7 
   All nontradables  8.0  6.8  5.1  4.3 4.2 5.7 9.4 7.2 7.3 8.2 2.3 
Non-product specific (NPS)  7.0  5.2  3.3 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.7 3.3 4.9 4.3 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  12.8  10.9  10.5  6.9  6.2 11.5 17.1 13.9 10.2 15.6  9.8 
             
Decoupled payments  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.1 5.2 9.3 5.9 6.3 8.4 5.6 
All agric (incl NPS & dec)  12.8  10.9  10.5  6.9  6.3 16.7 26.4 19.9 16.5 24.1 15.3 
             
All ag tradables (incl NPS)  12.5  10.8  10.8  7.0  6.2 12.0 18.0 14.4 10.4 16.5  9.9 
All nonag tradables  6.1  7.3  7.4  5.4 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.4 
RRA




Table 3 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, United States and Canada,




  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Covered products  8.7  7.2  7.0  16.0 22.5 28.6 20.8 12.3 13.5 11.4 
Non-covered products  6.6  5.4  4.9 9.8  12.9  14.9  10.6 6.2 7.1 6.7 
All agriculture (excl NPS)  8.1  6.8  6.5 15.0 21.2 26.3 18.9 11.0 12.0  9.1 
   All importables  15.1  11.7  12.0 31.1 45.2 50.9 41.8 36.2 42.0 45.0 
   All exportables  4.3  3.5  3.0 4.6 6.3  10.1 4.8 2.9 3.2 0.9 
   All nontradables  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Non-product specific (NPS)  na  4.9 4.0 5.7 9.1  13.2  12.8 7.8  12.1 2.2 
      Inputs  na  na  na 0.5 0.8 6.9 5.6 2.4 1.8 2.1 
   Other  na  4.9  4.0  5.2 8.3 6.3 7.2 5.5  10.4 0.1 
All agriculture (incl NPS)  8.1  11.7 11.0 20.8 30.3 39.7 31.6 18.9 23.9 11.4 
            
Decoupled payments  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.7 4.7 8.6 8.0 5.3  10.3  11.8 
All agric (incl NPS & dec)  8.1  11.7 11.0 21.5 35.0 48.3 39.6 24.3 34.2 23.2 
            
All ag tradables (incl NPS)  8.1  11.7 11.0 20.8 30.3 39.7 31.6 18.9 23.9 11.4 
All nonag tradables  9.2  6.9  6.0 5.1 4.8 3.9 2.6 1.1 0.8 0.8 
RRA
b  -1.0 4.5 4.7  14.9  24.3  34.5 28.3 17.6 22.9 10.5 
 
a Decoupled support includes ‘direct payments’ in the years 1979-85. From 1986 those payments are specified to comprise the OECD’s items C (payments 
based on area planted/animal numbers), D (payments based on historical entitlements), F (payments based on input constraints) and G (payments based on 
overall farming income). And for 2005-07, those items replaced by similar but newly defined items C to E. The values of those payments are estimated by the 
OECD. See text for discussion of non-product specific support. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts 
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on authors’ spreadsheet and OECD (2008 and earlier years).  
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Table 4: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, by product, per farm worker, and total, United States and Canada, 1955 to 2007 
 
      (a) by covered product (constant 2000 $US millions, excluding non-product-specific and decoupled payments) 
 
   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Barley na 14 19 44 97  141  518  392 48 53 20 
Beef  0  25 442 555 541 549 388 307  53  69  25 
Cotton  458  19 1573 1541  593  792 1170 1030 1094 1692 2442 
Egg  na  na  na  na 395 495 302 432 174  34 167 
Maize  0 273 509 998 163 848  1927 152 825  1316  1081 
Milk 3365 4253 4116 3829 7775  13778  12986 9875 3761 8125 6666 
Peas  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pigmeat  0 31 41 56 55 52  124  297 68 46 12 
Potato  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry  0 105 127 248 222 197 791 363  68  38  90 
Rapeseed  na 0 0 0 0 0  68 4 1 2 0 
Rice 0 0 0 0  54  212  261  219  76  344  33 
Sheepmeat na na na na 40 40 14  5 12 40 28 
Sorghum na na na na  436  636  261  4 40 40 36 
Soybean 0 0 0 0 0 0  91  18  734  1274  90 
Sugar 515 594 995 476 711  1015  1173 800 759 824 552 
Wheat  0  317 1308 1266 1248 1689 2108 1737  333  240  16 
Wool  na  na  na  na  na  na 1 1 0 3 5 
 
 
     (b) Per person engaged in agriculture (constant 2000 US$, including non-product-specific but not decoupled payments) 
 
 
   1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Total, North America   3115 3739 3445 4181 6720 8222 7370 5580 9165 7364 
     United States
  3383 3886 3431 3728 6303 7710 6831 5185 8795 7279 
     Canada




Table 4 (continued): Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, by product, per farm worker, and total, United States and Canada, 1960 
to 2005  
 
(c) total (constant 2000 $US millions) 
 
   1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
North America,  
Covered products  5632  9130  9014 12331 20445 22185 15636  8044 14142 11264 
     United States
  4708 8115 7731 9029  16177  18088  12781 6195  12227 9109 
     Canada
  924 1015 1283 3302 4268 4096 2856 1850 1915 2156 
North America,  
Cov+noncov  products  9886 12539 12345 15387 25132 28745 20788 13195 19816 12985 
     United States
  8552 11263 10821 11816 20473 24224 17599 11100 17591 10717 
     Canada
  1334 1276 1524 3570 4659 4521 3188 2095 2225 2268 
North America,  
Non-product-specific   7658 6192 3399 4077 5822 6863 8580 6999  10228  10166 
     United States
  7658 5269 2417 2678 3815 4548 6397 5491 7974 9598 
     Canada
  0  923  981 1399 2007 2315 2182 1508 2254  568 
North America, 
incl.  NPS    17544 18731 15743 19464 30954 35608 29368 20194 30044 
 
     23151 
     United States
  16210 16533 13238 14494 24288 28772 23997 16590 25564 20315 
     Canada
  1334 2199 2505 4970 6666 6836 5371 3603 4480 2836 
North America,  
Decoupled payments   0  0  0  529  11199  16979  11526  11012  15598  14795 
     United States
  0  0  0  352 10193 15529 10177  9990 13657 11826 
     Canada
  0  0  0  177 1006 1451 1349 1022 1941 2970 
North America, including 
NPS and decoupled  17544 18731 15743 19993 42153 52587 40894 31205 45643 37947 
     United States
  16210 16533 13238 14846 34481 44301 34174 26580 39222 32141 
     Canada
  1334 2199 2505 5147 7672 8286 6720 4625 6421 5806 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on author’s spreadsheet.  
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Table 5: Consumer tax equivalents of policies assisting farmers, covered products, total and per capita and by product, United States and 
Canada, 1960 to 2005 
 
(a) Aggregate CTE (percent) 
 
   1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04  2005 
Total, North America   5.7 8.4 6.1 7.2  12.6 9.8 1.9  -4.7  -2.4  -6.3
     United States
  5.4 8.4 5.9 5.8  11.0 7.5  -0.4  -6.8  -4.2  -8.5 
     Canada
  10.1 8.2 7.8  19.1  27.3  31.0 24.6 14.1 15.6 14.1 
            
 
     (b) CTE per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
 
   1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04  2005 
Total, North America   27 41 36 44 68 42  8  -18 -9  -26 
     United States
  26 40 34 35 58 32 -2  -26  -16  -35 
     Canada
  50  47  54 127 154 134  95  54  54  56 




Table 5 (continued): Consumer tax equivalents of policies assisting farmers, covered products, total and per capita and by product, United States 
and Canada, 1960 to 2005 
 
 (c) CTE by covered product (constant 2000 $US millions), United States, 1955 to 2007 
 
   1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04  2005 
Barley  na na na na na 89 99  -100  -95  -89 
Beef  0 426 547 531 475  -776  -1529  -1806  -1813  -1976 
Cotton  16  1489  1284 482 657  1028 865 965  1320  1955 
Egg  na  na  na -20  -9 -79 -54  -308  -409  -519 
Maize  246  435  822  95  566 -1320 -2947 -3257 -3702 -4374 
Milk  3398 3304 3056 5140  10134 9039 5777 1738 4264 1005 
Pigmeat  0  0  0  0  0 -1142 -1748 -2253 -2362 -3122 
Potato  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry  0 0 0 0 0  -134  -1076  -1263  -1328  -1657 
Rice  0  0  0  25  100  -46 -138 -201 -199 -357 
Sheepmeat  na  na  na  29 5 6 6  13  53  57 
Sorghum  na  na  na  0  0 -143 -189 -185 -163 -161 
Soybean  0  0  0  0  0 -199 -337 -365 -376 -483 
Sugar  1011 1683  791  965 1051 1421 1018  926  992  593 
Wheat  147 591 572 449 546  88  -126  -917  -859  -1293 
Wool  na  na  na  na  na 2 1 1 0 0 




(d) CTE by covered product (constant 2000 $US millions), Canada, 1961 to 2005 
 
   1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04  2005 
Barley  11 15 29 68 86 17 16  0  0  0 
Beef  26 41 52 54  108 70 54  6  5  0 
Egg  na na na 70  127 98  121 89 33  141 
Maize  17  23  27  23  23  22 1 0 0 0 
Milk  709  682  749 2542 3185 2847 2137 1471 1641 1663 
Peas  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  na 
Pigmeat  31  41  54  56  45 7 0 0 0 0 
Potato  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry  105 127 245 227 203 271 361  30  31  30 
Rapeseed  0 0 0 0 0  22 1 1 1 0 
Soybean  0 0 0 0 0 8 1 2 5 6 
Sugar  na na na 44 39 43 31 25 na na 
Wheat  28 25 37 38 55  152 42 -3 -6  0 
Canada  927  954 1194 3122 3871 3557 2767 1622 1710 1841 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on author’s spreadsheet. 
 Table 6: Political Action Committee (PAC) disbursements during the election cycle, United 
States, Nov. 2004 to Oct. 2006 
($million) 
 
Commodity of PAC:   
  
Sugar Alliance  1.2 
Farm Credit Council  1.0 
Dairy 0.8 
Texas Farm Bureau  0.5 
Cotton Council  0.3 
Sugar 0.3 
Cattlemens Beef  0.3 
Dairy 0.3 
Broiler Chickens  0.3 
FLA sugar  0.2 
Indiana Farm Bureau  0.2 
Sugar beets  0.2 
Farmers' Group  0.2 
Peanuts 0.2 
Eggs 0.2 
Michigan Farm Bureau  0.2 
Farmer Coop  0.1 
Sugar beets  0.1 
Beef 0.1 
  
TOTAL of ABOVE  6.7 
 
Source: Political Moneyline, www.tray.com Appendix: Complexities in analysing economic effects of farm policies of the United Stages 
and Canada 
 
The policies affecting producer prices in the United States and Canada, as summarized in the 
NRA estimates, have affected farmers’ production decisions in major and complex ways, albeit 




It is helpful to begin with trade policies and then to examine domestic farm support policies, 
before turning to the empirical literature. 
 
Agricultural trade policies 
Summarizing the effects of U.S. import restrictions and export promotion under the programs 
discussed earlier is difficult because of the variety of policy instruments used. These include 
import quotas, tariffs, special access provisions (such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative), 
“voluntary restraint” agreements (such as the ones on Australian beef sales to the U.S.), 
embargoes on trade with specific countries (such as grain exports to the Soviet Union), regional 
trade liberalization agreements (most notably NAFTA), and targeted export subsidies (EEP and 
DEIP). Some of the effects of those policies on domestic as compared to off-shore commodity 
prices are not straightforward.  
U.S. policy provides an ideal indicator of domestic relative to international reference 
price for its single most protected major commodity, namely sugar. The New York Mercantile 
Exchange trades contracts in both off-shore Caribbean basis raw sugar and landed, duty-paid 
sugar at U.S. port locations. The percentage difference between these prices gives a market-
based daily measure of the degree of protection afforded by the full complexity of the U.S. sugar 
program. The relevant price data are shown in Appendix Figure 5. 
Over the 2001-2005 period, the average NRA on raw sugar was 110 percent. Although 
the sugar program has many complexities, including production controls if minimum import 
levels are not met, this percentage is a good measure of the protection afforded the U.S. industry 
relative to the world market. In assessing the impact of world markets, it is also helpful to know 
that the NRA is achieved through application of tariff-rate quotas, which together with 
agreements under NAFTA and CAFTA permitted 2.6 million tons of sugar (raw value) to be 
imported (as compared to 9 million tons produced domestically). It is also helpful to know that 
these quotas are allocated to country governments in a political process, as opposed to being 
auctioned off or assigned to U.S. importing companies. The 2005 allocations are shown in 
Appendix Table 6. 
A more complicated trade policy picture is provided by dairy products. The price of milk 
is supported through government purchases of commodities to support prices for butter, nonfat 
dry milk (or powdered milk) and cheddar cheese, at prices that would attract imports if imports 
were allowed to enter freely. Since 1997 butter and cheese prices have generally been above the 
support levels, with the only product consistently purchased for price support being nonfat dry 
milk. In response to this, USDA cut the support price of nonfat dry milk over time, from $1.04 
per pound in 1997 to $0.80 in 2005, and purchases slowed. In this respect, the distortions to the 
tradable dairy commodity markets appear likely to be small, and have been analyzed as having as  
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their chief result forestalling the conversion of nonfat dry milk production in California (which 
now produces half the U.S. output) to other manufactured milk products (Bailey 2005). 
Nonetheless tariff-rate quotas on imports of these products remain in place. And, although the 
market price of milk for manufacturing has been above the support price in all recent years, the 
U.S. price for such milk has remained well above the New Zealand price which is the best 
candidate for an international reference price. The average NRA for the five years 2000-04, 
comparing the U.S. manufacturing milk price with that of New Zealand, is 51 percent.  
Import protection for other major commodities is minimal in the last two decades, as the 
commodities are exported and no longer have domestic programs that support market prices and 
thus draw imports that require section 22 quotas to foreclose. But quotas and tariff-rate quotas 
are used to restrict some competing imported products in fruits and vegetables, even from 
NAFTA partners. 
 
Domestic support policies 
The joint effects of border measures and domestic commodity programs are well illustrated by 
the case of milk. The price support system for manufacturing milk places a floor under the price 
of all milk produced. The effects of this policy is reasonable captured by internal and off-shore 
price comparisons. Over and above this support, classified pricing under marketing orders 
generates a price for fresh (drinking) milk that is higher. The premium for “Class I” milk varies 
regionally. The U.S. average increase to the price farmers receive for milk has been estimated in 
several studies over the last 30 years. A review by a Task Force of the American Agricultural 
Economics Association placed the average rate of subsidy achieved by classified pricing at 4 
percent (AAEA 1986). Although this study is 20 years old, the structure and extent of the 
marketing order system remains essentially in place to the present. This 4 percent is properly 
counted as domestic support that generates additional milk production that adds to world 
supplies of dairy products but does not impose a border distortion. In addition, under the 2002 
Farm Act there are the Milk Income Loss Protection program payments. 
A major problem in analyzing the production-inducing effects of the many domestic 
programs is that the data available to characterize them are government spending levels. It would 
be relatively straightforward conceptually, though difficult empirically, to estimate the effects of 
this spending if it took the form of classical production subsidies (as is the dairy program, 
essentially). Then we could calculate a percentage distortion of the market price by dividing 
spending on each commodity by the quantity produced, and estimate the effects of that 
percentage subsidy using the relevant elasticities of supply and demand for the subsidized 
commodities, taking into account interactions between commodities that are substitutes in either 
production or consumption (and often both), and between commodities that are related vertically, 
as feed and livestock.  
However, the bulk of U.S. spending in support of agriculture does not take the form of a 
production subsidy of this type. An attempt is made in Appendix Table 4 to distinguished 
“coupled” from “decoupled” payments. That attempt could be questioned, and the spending 
detailed in Apendix Table 5 is even more difficult to characterize. 
If U.S. policies had no effects on world market prices, specifically on the reference prices 
used to calculate the effects of trade restrictions, then the difficulties of estimating domestic 
support effects would be less important. But for the major U.S. commodities, the effects of U.S. 
policies on world markets are potentially significant. So it is important to assess the production 
effects of these policies.  
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The question of which governmental expenditures do most to influence agricultural 
production comes to a head first in deciding what programs to omit from consideration as output 
stimulators. The earlier discussion of Appendix Table 5 left out the big domestic food assistance 
programs – the Food Stamp Program and Child Nutrition Programs – which had FY 2005 
outlays of $50 billion, more than all the other programs listed in Appendix Table 4 combined. 
These programs are omitted on the grounds that they do not distort markets, but are analytically 
comparable to welfare programs that transfer cash to poor households.  
The only food programs included in Appendix Table 5 are those that explicitly attempt to 
support agricultural markets where surplus production is a problem. The major programs in this 
category are P.L. 480, where a mix of foreign need and domestic political interests come into 
play (spending about $800 million), and “Section 32” purchases by USDA, a program under 
which USDA, at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture, purchases commodities deemed 
to be in surplus for use in school lunch or other feeding programs (spending about $450 million). 
The OECD estimates a PSE of 23 percent of U.S. gross farm receipts for 1999-2001, and 
15, 16, and 16 percent for 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively (OECD 2006). The 2005 
percentage is quite close to the 14 percent calculated above with reference to Appendix Table 5. 
Both percentages are higher than would be obtained from NRA calculation using Appendix 
Table 3 data where, for 2005, the payments of $20.2 billion amount to 8.5 percent of the $239 
billion value of U.S. farm output. This occurs because Appendix Table 5 and OECD include a 
substantially wider range of government outlays as part of agricultural support. 
The question for analytical purposes is the effect of this activity on U.S. agricultural 
output, prices and trade. As the OECD definition of the PSE makes clear, this issue is 
sidestepped in measures like the ones just calculated. The issue has been confronted most 
directly in the context of international trade negotiations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
aggregates “all domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade” (World 
Trade Organization 2002) as the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). Under the Uruguay 
Round Agriculture Agreement (URAA) of 1994, the members of the WTO agreed to discipline 
their spending on these “amber box” programs, with some exceptions. The exceptions are “de 
minimis” provisions that exempt spending that is less than five percent of a commodity’s value 
(for commodity-specific programs) or five percent of all agricultural commodities produced in a 
country (for programs not tied to a specific commodity), and a “blue box” of programs that 
provide subsidies that are linked to production limitations.
21  
Each WTO member country is charged with notifying the WTO of its actions as related 
to URAA commitments. The United States, according to its notifications, has not provided 
support at levels that have reached its AMS commitments, and so has not had to undertake 
reductions in support under the URAA agreement. The biggest component of support up to 1996, 
deficiency payments, was in the blue box and so not disciplined. Since 1996, the biggest 
component of support, production flexibility contract payments under the FAIR Act, has been 
                                                 
21 With the product-specific de minimis provision, it makes a difference how products are aggregated. For example, 
if butter receives support worth 10 percent of its value and cheese and other milk products receive no support, it is 
still possible not to exceed the de minimis level of support for dairy products as a whole. Therefore a country has an 
incentive to define commodities broadly. In fact the US spreads its support for all dairy products over a single 
aggregate dairy category (which is appropriate since what is being supported at the farm level is the underlying raw 
material, milk).  But fruits and vegetables are not aggregated. U.S. submissions to the WTO report product-specific 
support for the following commodity categories: barley, beef, corn, cottonseed, cotton, dairy, pork, honey, canola, 
flaxseed, mustard, rapeseed, safflower, sunflower, mohair, oats, peanuts, rice, rye, sorghum, soybeans, sugar, 
tobacco, wheat, wool, potatoes, apples, cranberries, and lamb.  
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placed in the “green box”, defined as program outlays that do not have the effect of supporting 
prices and “have no, or at most minimal” trade-distorting effects on production.  
The latest notifications tabled by the United States as of 2007 were those for 2001. They 
are as follows (in billions of dollars): 
 
                                  URAA               Amber Box    Amber Box 
                Commitment    Total     net of 
                   de  minimis 
 
Product-specific          14.6     14.4 
Non-product-specific            6.8       0.0 
Total      19.1       20.4       14.4 
 
The product-specific items include dairy price supports ($4.5 billion) and sugar import protection 
($1.0 billion), as market support measures that do not involve payments and thus are excluded 
from the items listed in Appendix Tables 3 to 5. Loan deficiency payments and related marketing 
loan gains account for most of the rest. Production Flexibility Payments are notified as Green 
Box and not included here. The non-product-specific items include Market Loss Assistance 
payments ($4.6 billion), benefits from crop insurance programs ($1.8 billion), and input supply 
subsidies, mainly irrigation and grazing rights, $0.4 billion. Since 5 percent of aggregate U.S. 
agricultural output of $198 billion in 2001 is $9.9 billion, none of the $6.8 billion in non-
product-specific support has to be counted against the $19.1 billion URAA ceiling, and no 
disciplines are required on U.S. domestic support. 
As analytical categories, the amber box and green box raise several questions. The most 
obvious is how can Production Flexibility Contract payments be green, and at the same time 
Market Loss Assistance (MLA) payments, which provided a 50 percent supplement to PFC 
payments on exactly the same payment base, be amber. Since both are decoupled from the 
farmer’s production decisions in the sense that they do not change if the producer increases or 
decreases acreage or output of the covered crops, why are not both equally green? The answer in 
the URAA text, as cited in USDA’s explanation to Congress of why the U.S. notified the WTO 
that MLA payments fall into the amber box, is that MLA payments, as a Congressional policy 
response to low prices, are in fact “coupled” to market conditions and are therefore amber. The 
URAA is taken to require this even though the fixed payment base for the market loss assistance 
payments makes these payments not notably more production distorting than the PFC payments. 
Similarly, the Counter-cyclical Payments of the 2002 Act would have to be counted as Amber 
Box because they rise as prices fall, even though these payments too do not vary with a 
producer’s output. However, the Bush Administration has not notified WTO of its policies after 
2001, when the 2002 Act went into effect, possibly to avoid taking a stand on this issue.
22  
                                                 
22 The URAA has two requirements for payments to qualify for the green box.  First, there is the basic criterion that 
payments “shall have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production” (Annex 2, Paragraph 
1).  The second is a policy-specific requirement that “The amount of such payment in any given year shall not be 
related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after 
the base period” (Annex 2, Subparagraph 6(C). It would be possible to read this second requirement as pertaining to 
production over and above that of the base period (otherwise why use the term “undertaken”, which could be 
omitted if all production is meant). This interpretation preserves the sense of the basic criterion, and the Bush 
Administration’s unwillingness to embrace this plausible way of notifying MLA payments as green may be a reason 
why agricultural interests in Congress were irritated.  
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The marketing loan program is the aspect of U.S. policy that is closest to a classical 
production subsidy, since it makes use of the difference between a supported price and the 
market price on all of a producer’s output that can be documented as available for sale from a 
farm (up to quite liberal levels of payment restriction). Westcott and Price (2001) estimated of 
the output effects of marketing loan supports by removing price wedges attributable to marketing 
loan provisions as of 1998, and simulating the effects for each commodity to 2005. They used a 
model embodying a complete set of commodity supply and demand elasticities and cross-
elasticities, with baseline projections of yields and export demand. Taking an average of their 
results for 1999-2001, i.e., two to four years after the loan program is taken away, they estimate 
the following percentage changes in prices and quantities attributable to the program, as 
compared to the situation without the program:  
 
 
Commodity  Market price  Cropland Area 
Wheat -2.2  1.5 
Corn -1.4  0.4 
Soybeans -3.7  1.4 
Cotton
23 -9.0  6.0 
 
In contrast, it is arguable that the additional spending on direct and countercyclical 
payments, though large, is essentially a set of lump-sum payments that farmers cannot change 
through their decisions about what to produce, how much to produce, or the production practices 
followed. Therefore one may expect small if any output effects or price effects, and few if any 
deadweight losses due to market distortions.  
What does this argument miss? One issue is the permitted updating of acreage bases for 
payments in 2002, which blunts the point that the payments do not influence production 
decisions. Given that updating farmers have an incentive to maintain acreage in order to be in a 
favorable position for future updating. 
A second issue is a set of individually small but collectively significant policies that have 
remained in place: the market-distorting sugar support price; the Dairy Market Income Loss 
Protection (MILC) Program, which makes payments on current production (up to a limit of 2.4 
million pounds per year – equivalent to a herd of about 140 cows), a marketing loan program for 
peanuts that makes payments on a current production base, and the introduction, in the 2002 Act, 
of similar marketing loan programs for wool, mohair, honey, and pulses (chickpeas, lentils, and 
dry peas). These last are significant new production-inducing subsidy programs, albeit on 
products with aggregrate values too small to register in Appendix  Table 4. 
With respect to Product Flexibility Payments (1996 Act) or direct payments (2002 Act), 
reasons have been given as to why the payments may result in commodity production higher 
than would be the case in the absence of the program, despite their “decoupled” nature. Most 
notable among the reasons are wealth effects, insurance effects, and restrictions on use of land in 
growing horticultural crops. 
Whether any of these effects are quantitatively important is an empirical issue, and one 
that is impossible to estimate with precision from the data available. Westcott and Young (2001), 
                                                 
23 The cotton figures are Westcott-Price estimates only for quantity. I estimate producer price based on a demand 
elasticity of –2/3.    
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following up on Young and Westcott (2000), use estimates of wealth effects on planted acreage, 
developed from pre-1990 data by Chavas and Holt (1990), to estimate that during the period of 
the FAIR Act PFC payments had “the possible increases in aggregate planted acreage range from 
225,000 to 725,000”, or about 0.3 percent of total cropland (p. 11). Adams et al. (2001) consider 
1997-2000 acreage data directly for 11 major U.S. program-crop states. They find a positive 
effect of PFC plus market loss assistance (supplemental PFC) payments, but the effect has only 
marginal statistical significance. FAPRI’s simulations imply that $10 billion in payments, about 
the average level in 1998-2001, would cause about 2.75 million acres of U.S. cropland to be 
devoted to program crops that would not have been in the absence of the FAIR Act, 1 percent of 
the acreage planted to those crops. The implied output effect of about 1 percent means the 
payments introduced in the FAIR Act had about half the downward world price effect of the 
marketing loan program. In view of the weak statistical significance of the underlying 
coefficient, the estimates are best taken as an upper limit of the program’s effects. 
In addition to commodity program effects, the Federal Crop Insurance Program has 
increased its subsidies and hence participation in the program since the 1994 Crop Insurance 
Reform Act. Estimates in the literature imply that $3 billion in crop insurance subsidies, a level 
being approached after 2005, would increase aggregate U.S. crop acreage by 0.5 to 10.0 percent, 
a remarkably wide range of uncertainty (see Glauber and Collins 2002; Young, Vandeveer and 
Schneff 2001; Orden 2001; Keaton, Skees and Long 2001). The most careful and detailed of 
these studies suggest the lower end of this range is most plausible. Young, Vandeveer, and 
Schneff project average acreages and yields during 2001-2010 in the absence of subsidized crop 
insurance. They estimate 960,000 acres would be withdrawn from grain, soybean, and cotton 
production (less than 0.5 percent), with more than half of this acreage from the Great Plains, a 
primarily wheat-growing area. Their implied estimate is that production of wheat would decline 
about 0.8 percent, cotton 1.7 percent, feed grains 0.2 percent, and soybeans 0.1 percent. 
 
Overall effects  
Although any estimate is conjectural, the set of most-reasonable estimates indicate that in the 
1999-2005 period the marketing loan program has increased the U.S. output of grains and 
soybeans by about 2 percent, the direct payment program, including the 2002 Act’s changes, 
about 1 percent, and crop insurance subsidies by 1+ percent, for a total effect of 4 to 5 percent 
more of these commodities being produced in 1999-2002 than would have been the case in the 
absence of commodity support programs.  
 
Long-run policy effects 
The long-run consequences of commodity support policies are a quite different matter. One has 
to consider government programs that have a longer-term focus (conservation, agricultural 
research), and the long-term effects of price supports through farmers’ investment and 
technology adoption decisions. 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) idled 34 million acres (10 percent of all land 
used for crops) as of 2006, roughly the same level as for the last 15 years. If that program were to 
end, what would the output effects be? Most land in the CRP is designated as highly erodible or 
having other characteristics that make cropping it more than usually threatening to water quality 
(such as land within 100 feet of a stream or lake). These lands are expected to have lower than 
average yields when cropped, but analysis by the Economic Research Service of USDA has 
estimated that yield capacities of CRP land are not far below each area’s corresponding cropped  
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acreage on average; but 58 percent of CRP land is in the relatively low-yielding Great Plains 
states and only 18 percent is in the Corn Belt. So bringing this land back into production would 
have a disproportionately large effect on wheat production. Assuming two-thirds of CRP land 
would return to crop production with 85 percent of the yield of average U.S. cropland, 
assumptions consistent with USDA-ERS analyses, a reasonable estimate of the effect on 
aggregate grain and soybean output is that the CRP has decreased output by the equivalent of 
(34ּ0.67ּ0.85=) 19 million U.S. average-quality cropland acres, about 7 percent. Thus the CRP 
slightly more than offsets the production increasing effects of marketing loans, crop insurance, 
and direct payments as operated under the 2002 Act. 
In its benefit-cost analysis of the CRP, USDA estimates imply that 34 million acres 
placed in the program increase the prices of wheat, corn, and soybeans by 11 percent, 13 percent, 
and 12 percent respectively (USDA 1997, p. 7602). These estimated effects are probably too 
large as long-run impacts, but even if the long-run effects are only half as large, they still roughly 
offset the price-reducing effects of the USDA’s current commodity support programs. 
 
Empirical evidence 
In order to provide an informal reality check for the preceding estimates of commodity program 
effects (not counting long-term effects of conservation or research programs), consider the time 
series data on corn, soybean, and wheat acreage, as shown in Appendix Figure 6. The period 
between 1970 and 1981 is one in which a huge increase in plantings of these crops occurred, 
from 160 to 240 million acres, a 50 percent increase. This expansion was induced by price rises 
in which farm-level corn and soybean prices more than doubled and wheat prices tripled. During 
the commodity crash and consequent farm income crisis of the 1980s, this acreage fell back, 
partly in response to lower prices and partly because of federal acreage-idling programs of pre-
1996 legislation. The acreage reductions of 1983, 1986, and 1987 are specific consequences of 
these programs. By 1990-1995 relative stability in acreage emerged for aggregate grain and 
soybean acreage, but with a moderate continuing trend away from wheat and into soybeans. In 
this context the FAIR Act of 1996 was intended to let farmers respond more fully to market 
prices rather than deficiency payments (a goal already partly achieved in the 1990 Farm Act and 
likely responsible for some of the move to soybeans in 1990-1995).  
What were the consequences of moving to “freedom to farm” in the 1996 Act? What was 
most clearly expected was a further shift to soybeans, and indeed this shift occurred. Beyond 
price incentives, one reason was the desire of some Corn Belt growers to introduce a two-year 
corn-soybean rotation for pest control purposes, but who had been trapped into continuous corn 
or nearly so by the loss of corn deficiency payments if they shifted to soybeans beyond the limits 
allowed under the limited flexibility provisions of the 1990 Act. However, regional data make it 
clear that the move to soybeans was not just a Corn Belt adjustment. Table 11 shows planted 
acreages for the main regions comparing the two years just before the FAIR Act (1994 and 1995 
average) with the last two years (2000 and 2001 average). Soybean acreage increased by about 
the same amount (6 million acres) in both the Corn Belt and Great Plains, and by a much larger 
percentage in the latter. 
Aggregate acreage for the three crops increased most in the Corn Belt. As Appendix 
Figure 6 shows, the main jump in acreage occurred in 1996. The predominant causes were the 
high commodity prices that persisted over a year from mid-1995, and the end of legislated 
acreage reduction programs. The effect of the FAIR Act’s marketing loan, PFC payment, and 
crop insurance programs was to maintain that higher acreage. This can be seen most clearly by  
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plotting the data in price-quantity space. Appendix Figure 7 shows corn acreage planted and the 
average price received by farmers for the preceding crop.
24 It is noteworthy that the 1998-2002 
levels of plantings are clustered in the lower right-hand corner of price-quantity space. This 
means that the acreage-response supply function lies below the supply function of earlier years. 
Why? One reason is that the real cost of producing corn has declined (note that prices are 
deflated to give real values), attributed to technological advances -- improved seed, machinery, 
etc. 
  
Wheat 3  crops 
 
-1,802 4,897 
-23.1 percent 5.2 percent
  
-5,462 2,651 
-13.2 percent 3.9 percent
  
-49 -1,721 
-1.1 percent  -8.1 percent
  
-1,255 185 
-7.8 percent  0.8 percent
  
-8,567 6,013 
-12.3 percent 2.9 percent
  
There is an overall tendency for successive observations to lie lower and to the right, as the 
division of the data into the 1980s (squares), early 1990s (triangles), and 1998-2002 (diamonds) 
indicates. In addition, corn programs, particularly set-asides, make a difference. This is most 
obvious in the case of the Payment-in-Kind acreage idling program of 1983, which brought 
planted corn acreage down to 60 million. The 7.5 percent corn acreage reduction in the 1995 
program in responsible for the left-most triangle in the 1990-1997 data and the only such year in 
which corn had an acreage reduction program. 
The data suggest that the loan deficiency payments and perhaps the market-loss 
assistance payments of 1998-2001 also have played a role. Sketching in supply functions 
(adjusted for acreage reductions in years when they occurred) as shown in Appendix Figure 7 
indicates that the curve shifted down by about 65 cents per bushel between 1991-97 and 1998-
2002. If technical progress reduced costs by 2 percent per year during this period (USDA’s 
estimate of the long-term average total factor productivity growth for U.S. agriculture), this 
                                                 
24 This price is called the lagged price in the diagram, because it is received in marketing the crop preceding the crop 
whose planted acreage is shown. But the time is which the prices are observed actually coincides with the planting 
period. For example the price that corresponds to planted acreage in 2001 is the average price received for the 2000 
crop. Most of the crop is sold in the months immediately following the harvest, in October 2000 to January 2001, 
just a few months before planting the 2001 crop; but some sales whose prices make up the season average price of 
2000-crop corn occur throughout the marketing year, which goes through August 2001. Therefore, it is possible that 
observation of plantings could influence the “lagged” price to some extent, and we would not be able to identify the 
acreage-proxied supply function exactly.  
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could have accounted for a shift of about 12 percent over the six years from the midpoint of the 
1991-97 period to the midpoint of the 1998-2002 period, which at an average price of $2.50 
would amount to 30 cents. This leaves a 35-cent apparent supply shift unaccounted for. That is, 
in 1998-2002 farmers are planting an acreage of corn that, based on farmers’ historical behavior, 
would have required a price 35 cents per bushel higher than the actual price we observe in 1998-
2002. (If there were no cost reductions, and the underlying real cost situation has remained the 
same since 1991, then the apparently missing price incentive is 65 cents per bushel.) 
Recall from the earlier discussion of marketing loans that the average marketing loan 
benefit for 1999-2000 was 26 cents per bushel. This explains a substantial part of the apparent 
supply shift – if producers expect a 26-cent marketing loan benefit, they will commit acreage to 
corn that they would commit if the market price (which doesn’t include the marketing loan 
benefit) was 26 cents higher and there were not marketing loans (as there were not in the higher-
priced years of 1991-1997). Since the total apparent supply shift (measured vertically) is 65 
cents, this leaves a 9-cent (if corn production costs were reduced 12 percent) to 39-cent (if costs 
were not reduced at all) shift to be explained by other factors. The prime candidate is the 
Production Flexibility and Market Loss Assistance payments made under the FAIR Act. 
To estimate the additional corn production created by the policies, we need to convert the 
vertical shift to a horizontal one. For this transformation only one parameter is necessary, the 
elasticity of supply. Assuming it is 0.3, the horizontal shift is 1.2 (12 percent cost reduction) to 
4.5 percent (no cost reduction). Taking the midpoint, and assuming no yield effects, the 
implication is that policies in place under the FAIR Act generated about 3 percent more corn 
than would have been the case under pre-1996 policies. 
The data for soybeans indicate an even larger soybean acreage effect in 1998-2002. 
Despite record-low real prices, acreage keeps increasing. In part, following the discussion earlier, 
this is attributable to the FAIR Act’s removal of previously existing disincentives to grow 
soybeans. Indeed, the soybean data call into question the estimate of the corn effect as estimated, 
because it too could be in part a result of corn acreage moving to soybeans as a result of FAIR 
Act soybean provisions rather than corn subsidies. The data of Appendix Figure 6 and Appendix 
Table 7 suggest that even a corn-soybean aggregate analysis would not tell the whole story, 
because there has been a substitution of both of these crops, but especially soybeans, for wheat. 
For the three-crop aggregate, the data indicate an acreage effect of about 4 percent. Appendix 
Figure 6  plots the path labeled “policy phase-out” as an estimated 4 percent less during 1999-
2001 as the difference between the U.S. acreage actually planted to corn, soybeans, and wheat 
and the acreage the would have been planted in the absence of the PFC payments, market-loss 





Appendix Table 8 shows applied tariff rates for Canadian agricultural, food, and nonfood 
manufacturing products. Wheat makes the highest contribution to Canada’s measured tariff 
protection, but it is not clear how meaningful the tariff is, since the main cross-border traffic in 
wheat would be with the U.S., which under NAFTA would not be subject to those duties. There 
have been non-tariff barriers to wheat movement, most notably in the case of durum wheat in the 
1990s, but here it was Canadian exports to the U.S. that were restricted. It is also likely that the  
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Canadian Wheaet Board (CWB) at times exercises voluntary restraint on exports to the U.S. 
(Gray and Gardner 1995). 
As of 2000, the tariff levels for supply-managed commodities, which apply once 
triggering quantities are reached, were: milk, 241 percent, butter 299 percent, skim milk powder 
202 percent, turkey meat 155 percent, eggs 164 percent, and chicken meat 238 percent (Schmitz, 
Furtan, and Baylis 2002, p. 272). These levels do not necessarily indicate differences between 
domestic Canadian and world reference prices, however, since they are set higher than necessary 
in years of average world price levels, so that no quantities will be imported above the in-quota 
levels that trigger the duties even in years when world prices are unusually low (so substantially 
lower tariffs might have been sufficient). Moreover, to the extent that supply management 
programs are actually restricting Canadian supplies, the effects on world markets of liberalizing 
the policies are unclear even as to the sign of the effect on world prices. Letting more products 
into Canada would be positive for world prices but letting Canadians produce more would be 
negative. 
Because they make payments to producers based on estimates of returns for the farm 
enterprise as a whole, the main Canadian programs since 1991 do not lend themselves well to 
commodity-specific analysis. We can compare Canadian producer prices to international 
reference prices, adjusted for transportation and other transactions costs, and for differences in 
quality characteristics between Canadian and reference traded commodities. 
The major long-standing market support policies for grains and livestock operate outside 
the Agricultural Policy Framework – the Canadian Wheat Board CWB and the supply 
management programs for livestock. As mentioned earlier, the CWB has a monopoly of 
Canadian wheat and barley exports. It is one of the largest wheat merchandisers in the world, and 
accounted for 12 percent of the world cereals market according to a recent estimate (Carter. 
Loyns, and Berwald 1998). The CWB aims to sell strategically in competition with other 
exporters, notably Australia, the EU, and the U.S. The strategy became one of matching export 
subsidies in the 1980s and 1990s. In a subsidizing world, the CWB could increase the farmers’ 
“pooled” price of wheat exported and sold to domestic millers by selling less for domestic 
millers’ use and more on the world market. With a relatively inelastic demand in the domestic 
market, this approach generates price discrimination that in principle would increase the farmer’s 
revenue from any given amount sold. The effectiveness of this policy has been questioned by 
producer groups as discussed earlier (Schmitz and Furtan 2000). The question again is how to 
estimate appropriately the market-distorting effects of the CWB in the international perspective. 
Given the structure of Canada’s policies, with commodity price effects within Canada 
and between Canada and world market prices impossible to observe directly via policy 
instruments, the most feasible empirical approach is simply to compare internal Canadian prices 
to the closest corresponding international reference prices. The description of policies and policy 
instruments provides a qualitative sense of what to expect in such comparisons, but not much 
more. In price-comparison approach, we give up the attempt to determine detailed sources of 
distortions and take policies as, roughly, black boxes that generate the observed effects. 
Consider wheat, Canada’s most important farm product in value of production, and a 
paradigm of a heavily traded and reasonably standardized commodity with good historical 
international price data. What is the most appropriate comparison of Canadian and U.S. prices to 
measure “bottom line” protection of the Canadian wheat market? On the Canadian side, the best 
available candidate for a wholesale price is the price quoted for sales from the Canadian Wheat 
Board, f.o.b. Thunder Bay (Lake Superior). A widely used international reference price for wheat  
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is the U.S. Gulf price published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This price is for hard red 
winter wheat, comparable in quality to the predominant Canadian wheat but not as close as dark 
northern spring wheat (winter wheat, planted in the fall, generally does not survive northern 
winters) which has prices quoted at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.
25 So, a good indicator of 
Canadian protection should be the Thunder Bay relative to the Minneapolis price. This is shown 
as NRA3 in Figure 8a.  
It indicates about a 20 percent rate of protection in 1997-2003. This indicator can be 
questioned on the ground that the Thunder Bay price is an asking price posted by the CWB 
rather than a transactions price. The CWB makes deals at both discounts and premiums from this 
price (but jealously guards any information about prices in these deals). A better indicator might 
be the realized export value of Canadian wheat. FAO’s data on the unit export value of Canadian 
wheat, relative to the Minneapolis price. This is shown as NRA2 in Figure 8. It suggests the 
CWB has been doing vastly better than the Thunder Bay price since the mid-1990s, averaging 
almost 70 percent over Minneapolis in 2000-03. This seems too good to be true (why aren’t the 
CWB customers going after the much cheaper Minneapolis and Gulf wheat)? In addition, a lot of 
Canadian wheat goes to domestic milling and livestock feeding (which is outside CWB control). 
So the export price may be overstating the protection given to wheat as a whole. For information 
on farm-level protection NRA1 in Appendix Figure 8 shows the percentage relationship between 
the FAO producer price of wheat in Canada, and the U.S. gulf price, backed off to the U.S. farm 
level (using the average margin over this data period of $24 per tonne). By this measure 
Canadian wheat is disprotected by about 20 percent in recent years.
26 Overall, the wheat price 
comparisons, unfortunately, provide more of a puzzle than an answer. For present purposes I use 
the middle-of-the-road estimate, the Thunder Bay/Minneapolis relationship. 
Canadian relative to international reference prices for other commodities vary in ways 
that are not transparently related to policies for some of them. Comparisons for Canada’s top ten 
commodities by market value (excluding potatoes), which accounted for 70.4 percent of the 
value of Canada’s farm output in 2005, are shown in Appendix Table 9.  
The final two tables in this appendix provide details of the annual NRA estimates for the 
United States and Canada. 
                                                 
25 It should be noted too that the Gulf Price (New Orleans) is not really a market price at the Gulf, but rather 
USDA’s imputation of a price at the Gulf using price quotes for wheat traded at the Kansas City or Chicago 
exchanges plus their estimate of shipping costs to the Gulf. 
26 A farm-level NRA can also be estimated by comparing the FAO producer prices for Canada and the US. This 
measure indicates even greater disprotection of Canadian wheat in recent years, averaging about -25 percent in 
2000-03. Finally, it might be the case that because of NAFTA, Canadian and U.S. prices are jointly elevated relative 
to the rest of the world. To consider that possibility, an NRA was calculated with respect to the Australia wheat 
price reported by IFS. This generated an NRA of roughly zero over the last ten years. A Thunder Bay price 20 
percent over Minneapolis but not above Australia is the opposite of what the NAFTA protection-in-common 
hypothesis would suggest (a common US-Canada price above the level of the Australian price).   
 
12
Appendix Figure 1: Number of farms, United States, 1940 to 2005 
 
Sources: Census of Agriculture, 2002, Agricultural Statistics, 2006, and Carter 
(2006). 






















Appendix Figure 2: Number of farms and crop area, Canada, 1961 to 2003  
 
 
Source of data: FAOSTAT 



















































Appendix Figure 3: Total factor productivity of farms, United States, 1950 to 2005 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (as reported in Economic Report of 
the President, 2006, Table B-100) 




























Appendix Figure 4: Land area and output per farm, Canada, 1961 to 2001 
 
 












































































Appendix Figure 5: Prices and nominal rate of assistance for raw sugar, United States, 
1955 to 2005 
 
 




























Appendix Figure 6: Area planted to corn, soybean and wheat, United States, 1970 to 
2001 























































































Appendix Figure 8: Nominal rate of assistance for wheat, Canada, 1980 to 2003 
 
 
        


























NRA1: Can. farm/(US Gulf-margin)
NRA2: Can. export value/Minn
NRA3: Can. T.B./Minn 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  
From farming   2,598 5,539 3,473 7,884  14,201 
From off-farm sources   59,349 58,578 62,285 60,713  67,279 
Total household income   61,947 64,117 65,757 68,597  81,480 
   
U.S. average household 
income   57,045 58,208 57,852 59,087 60,528 
   
       
Farm operator household 
income as % of U.S. average  109 110 114 116 135 
 




Appendix Table 2: Tariffs on imported products, United States, 1989 to 2005 
(percent) 
 











1989  0.9 3.2 6.3 4.2 12.0 
1990  1.0 3.2 6.4 4.2 11.9 
1991  1.0 3.1 6.2 4.3 5.8 
1992  0.9 3.0 6.2 4.3 5.5 
1993  0.8 2.7 6.3 4.3 5.2 
1994     6.3 4.2 5 
1995  0.8 2.6 7.0 3.7 5.1 
1996  5.7 2.9    5.2 
1997  4.4 3.9 7.2 3.4 5.4 
1998  5.0 4.0 6.4 3.1 5.4 
1999  3.5 2.5 6.3 2.9 5.1 
2000  3.1 2.2 6.0 2.8 4.7 
2001  3.4 2.1 6.2 2.7 4.6 
2002  3.2 2.0    4.7 
2003  2.7 1.9    5.1 
2004  2.5 2.0    4.8 
2005  2.5 1.8     
 
Sources: UNCTAD-TRAINS, compiled through WITS (for agriculture), Kee, Nicita 




Appendix Table 3: Expenditures on farm support, by program type, United States, 





 Direct  Counter-  Subsidy Conservation  Ad  hoc Other** 
 Payments cyclical    payments* Reserve  Assistance  
FY   Payments  Program      Total
1998 5,672  0  2,229 1,693 26 523  10,143
1999 5,476  0  5,763 1,435 5,306 1,243  19,223
2000 5,057  0  10,354 1,476 12,536 2,842  32,265
2001 4,105  0  7,409 1,625 7,845 1,121  22,105
2002 3,968  0  8,977 1,785 427 523  15,680
2003 3,857 1,743  3,206 1,785 4,317 2,517  17,425
2004 5,278  809  2,033 1,786 1,057 -388  10,575
2005 5,236 2,772  5,979 1,788 2,580 1,832  20,187
* Loan Deficiency Payments, Net CCC Purchases, Cotton User Payments, Dairy Payments 


























Pct.    
cattle 34,888 
Some gains from feed 
crop progs. 
dairy 27,549  295 0.011 classified  pricing,   
corn 24,381  4,551 0.187 2,889 0.118 0.305    
chickens  20,505  Same as cattle 
soybeans 17,895 598 0.033 299 0.017 0.050    
hogs  13,072  Same as cattle 
hay 12,211     
eggs  5,903  Same as cattle 
cotton 5,731  1,879 0.328 1,809 0.316 0.644    
wheat 4,950  1,140 0.230 78 0.016 0.246    
turkeys  3,065  Same as cattle 
grapes 3,011    
potatoes  2,575  Program ended in 50s 
almonds 2,189     
tomatoes 2,158     
citrus  2,099  Program ended in 90s 
lettuce 2,015     
sugar crops  1,928  61 0.032 0.032 import quota 
tobacco  1,752  18 0.010 0.010 Prod quotas ending 
rice 1,702  585 0.344 133 0.078 0.422    
apples 1,648  ad  hoc.  purchases 
Top 25  191,227  9,066 0.047 5,269 0.028 0.075    
The Rest  18,027  611* 0.034 0.034    
Total Agric.  209,254  9,066 0.043 5,269 0.025 0.069    




Appendix Table 5: USDA budget data, United States, 2001 and 2005  
 
($million, fiscal years*) 
 
      
2001 2005
   
Contract Payments (2001) and Direct Payments (2005)  4,105  5236
Supplemental Payments (2001) and Countercyclical (2005)  5,455  2772
Loan Deficiency Payments  5,293  3856
Price Support Loans and Sales  1,377  1532
Disaster Assistance  3,146  2395
Other** 3,168  3060
Commodity Programs Outlays(CCC) (subtotal):  22,544  18,851
   
Conservation Reserve  1,358  1,788
EQIP and other  288  22
Natural Resource Management Programs  1,000  1,198
Conservation Programs (subtotal):  2,646  3,008
   
Export Credit Guarantees***  3,227  2,625
Market Development Programs  119  184
Export Subsidy Programs  15  1
Foreign Food Assistance  1,659  1,719
Export Programs (subtotal):  5,020  4,529
   
Farm Loan and Grant Programs (Budget Authority)  171  322
   
Crop Insurance, net indemnities paid  2,200  1,182
   
Administrative costs, above programs  2,223  2,440
   
Federal Research Funding  1,999  2,381
   
Marketing and Regulatory Programs  1,279  1,385
   
Total activity in support of agriculture  38,082  34,098
      
*Fiscal years are Oct-Sept., e.g., FY2001 is October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001 
**Includes cotton user payments, interest expenses, and "Section 32" commodity  
purchases (the last not in the CCC budget but included here).     
***Amount of loans guaranteed, not the government's costs 
      








Countries tons       
Argentina 77,258    Madagascar  7,258 
Australia 149,126    Malawi  17,968 
Belize 19,764    Mauritius  21,560 
Bolivia 14,374    Mozambique  23,357 
Brazil 260,522    Nicaragua  37,730 
Colombia 43,121    Panama  52,105 
Congo 7,258    Papua  New  Guinea  7,258 
Cote D'Ivoire  7,258    Paraguay  7,258 
Costa Rica  26,951    Peru  73,664 
Dom. Republic  252,935    Philippines  224,012 
Ecuador 19,764    South  Africa  41,324 
El Salvador  46,714    Swaziland  28,747 
Fiji 12,934    Taiwan  13,953 
Guatemala 86,241    Thailand  25,154 
Guyana 21,560    Trinidad-Tobago  12,576 
Honduras 17,968    Uruguay  7,258 
India 11,497    Zimbabwe  21,560 
Jamaica 19,764    NAFTA  830,015 
    
CAFTA TRQs (Calendar 
year) 86,000 
     All  Sugar  2,633,766 
 





Appendix Table 7: Increase in crop planted acreages, United States, 1994/95 to 
2001/02* 
 
    
 Corn  Soybeans 
    
change in million acres (percentage change below each entry) 
    
Midwest 150  6,550 
 0.3 percent 16.6 percent 
    
Plains 2,030  6,083 
 12.0 percent 69.2 percent 
    
South -293  -1,380 
 -5.6 percent -11.8 percent 
    
All other states  564  876 
 10.2 percent 41.8 percent 
    
US Total  2,452  12,128 
 3.3 percent 19.5 percent 
    
* Averages of two crop years. 
Midwest: IA,IL,IN,MI,MI,MN,MO,OH,WI 
Plains: KS,ND,NE,OK,SD,TX   
South: AL,AR,FL,GA,KY,LA,MS,NC,SC,TN,VA  
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Appendix Table 8: Applied tariff rates, Canada, 1988 to 2005  
(percent) 
      
 










1988            
1989   0.0  0.0  2.6  5.3  7.2 7.5 
1990          7.2 7.5 
1991          7.2 7.6 
1992          7.2 7.6 
1993   0.0  0.0  0.7  3.4  7.6 7.3 
1994          7.6 7.3 
1995   0.0  0.0  5.3  25.6  32.6 6.5 
1996  87.6 0.0 0.0  5.9  24.3  29.9 5.2 
1997  85.5 0.0 0.0  0.7  2.1  8.0 4.8 
1998  64.9 0.0 0.0  2.2  16.6  25.2 3.4 
1999  3.4 0.0 0.0  1.5  16.2 25.1 3.1 
2000  1.3 0.0 0.0  0.2  1.4  5.4 3.0 
2001  28.3 0.0 0.0  0.3  1.7  5.3 3.1 
2002  64.2 0.0 0.0  0.5  1.4  5.3 3.1 
2003  30.5 0.0 0.0  0.3  1.3  4.9 3.1 
2004  1.3 0.0 0.0  0.2  1.0  4.1 3.1 
2005  1.3 0.0 0.0  0.2  1.0    
              
Sources: Agriculture, UNCTAD-TRAINS, compiled through WITS; Manufactures, Nicita 




Appendix Table 9: Percentage by which farm producer price exceeds external price, 










    
wheat  17.1  18.3  18.7  17.0  17.8  3,985  
beef  -19.4  -15.2  -1.8  1.7  -8.7  3,289  
rapeseed  -27.7  -25.7  6.9  0.7  -11.4  2,399  
pigmeat  7.4  4.4  11.5  8.8  8.0  2,359  
milk  151.1  107.9  69.1  153.5  120.4  2,154  
barley  -38.9  -27.8  -28.6  -42.1  -34.4  1,182  
chicken  22.4  6.0  28.2  -42.1  3.6  1,137  
maize  2.2  8.8  16.7  -3.0  6.2  975  
soybeans  -3.3  -0.5  -1.1  0.4  -1.1  653  




Appendix Table 10: Annual distortion estimates, USA, 1955 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 





1955 na  0  0 na  0 21  0 na  0 
1956 na  0  0 na  0 22  0 na  0 
1957 na  0  2 na  0 22  0 na  0 
1958 na  0  9 na  0 21  0 na  0 
1959 na  0 18 na  0 15  0 na  0 
1960 na  0  0 na  0 14  0 na  0 
1961 na  0  0 na  2 15  0  0  0 
1962 na  0  0 na  2 30  0  0  0 
1963 na  0  0 na  2 31  0  0  0 
1964 na  0  1 na  1 28  0  0  0 
1965 na  2  2 na  2 25  0  0  0 
1966 na  2 83 na  2 15  0  0  0 
1967 na  2 90 na  2 25  0  0  0 
1968 na  2 71 na  3 20  0  0  0 
1969 na  2 80 na  3 20  0  0  0 
1970 na  2 85 na  3 21  0  0  0 
1971 na  2 60 na  4 22  0  0  0 
1972 na  2 40 na  6 19  0  0  0 
1973 na  2 25 na  4  5  0  0  0 
1974 na  2  6 na  0 18  0  0  0 
1975 na  2  5 na  0 22  0  0  0 
1976 na  2 30 na  0 15  0  0  0 
1977 na  2  1 na  0 35  0  0  0 
1978 na  2  7 na  2 25  0  0  0 
1979  na 2 3 4 0  30 0 0 0 
1980  na 2 9 5 3  52 0 0 0 
1981  na 2  13 6 0  60 0 0 0 
1982  na 2  21 6 4  65 0 0 0 
1983  na 2  17 6 0  80 0 0 0 
1984  na 2  18 6 6  52 0 0 0 
1985  na 2  29 6  11  70 0 0 2 
1986  115 2  55 0  21  60 0 0 4 
1987  115 3  25 8  11  56 0 0  25 
1988  12 0  31 8 7  52 0 0 4 
1989 6 0  23 1 2  247 0 0 0 
1990  41 1 9 2 2  59 0 0 1 
1991  61 1  21 4 0  68 0 0 2 
1992  38 0  43 6 0  62 0 0 1 
1993 89  2 40 15  0 58  5  0  0 
1994 70  0 10 13  0 52  5  0  1 
1995 3 0  10  10 0  34 0 0 1 
1996 0 0  20 1 0  64 0 0 0 
1997 0 0  30 0 1  69 0 0 0 
1998  14 0  28 0 8  114 0 0 0 
1999 7 0  51 0  15  113 0 0 0 
2000  10 0  93 0  15  100 0 0 0 
2001 3 0  84 0 7  83 0 0 0 
2002 1 0  90 0 0  66 0 0 0 
2003 0 0  53 0 1  46 0 0 0 
2004  12 0  30 0  12  38 0 0 0 
2005 8 0  77 0  20  23 0 0 0 
2006  2 0  77 0 0 20 0 0  0 
2007  0 0  77 0 0 29 0 0  0  
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m Soybean  Sugar  Wheat  Wool 
All 
covered 
1955 0  na  na 0  47 0  na 4 
1956 0  na  na 0  12 0  na 4 
1957 0  na  na 0  53 0  na 5 
1958 0  na  na 0  74 0  na 5 
1959 0  na  na 0  66 0  na 5 
1960 0  na  na 0  78 0  na 3 
1961 0  na  na 0  75 0  na 4 
1962 0  na  na 0 0 1  na 5 
1963 0  na  na 0  26 8  na 6 
1964 0  na  na 0  151 9  na 6 
1965  0 na na  0  175 13 na  6 
1966  0 na na  0  167 15 na  7 
1967  0 na na  0  177 18 na  9 
1968  0 na na  0 81 22 na  8 
1969  0 na na  0 71 21 na  8 
1970  0 na na  0 52 21 na  8 
1971 0  na  na 0 9  22  na 8 
1972 0  na  na 0 0  21  na 7 
1973 0  na  na 0 0 7  na 3 
1974 0  na  na 0  29 1  na 4 
1975 0  na  na 0  63 1  na 4 
1976 0  na  na 0  43 1  na 4 
1977 11 na na  0 27  2 na  5 
1978  1 na na  0 30 26 na  6 
1979 1 5  13 0  39  18  na 6 
1980 1 6  14 0 6 4  na 8 
1981 2 7  22 0  16 9  na 9 
1982  17 7  17 0  111  11  na  12 
1983  25 8  113 0  152  21  na  15 
1984  33 7  21 0  317  11  na  12 
1985  48 7  21 0  341  39  na  17 
1986  98 1  34 3  141  36 2  18 
1987  27 1  13 0  164  48 1  17 
1988 9 1 5 0  88  16 1  11 
1989  12 1 1 0  58 7 0  17 
1990  21 1 1 0  53  23 1  10 
1991  13 1 0 0  95  38 1  12 
1992  34 1 0 0  88  21 1  11 
1993  21 1 0 0  101  27 1  13 
1994  12 1 0 0  57  19 1 9 
1995 1 1 0 0  64 2 1 3 
1996 0 1 0 0  59 0 1 3 
1997 0 1 0 0  57 0 1 4 
1998 1 1 7 9  94 8 1 8 
1999 36 14 16 23  207 17  2 13 
2000 58 14  9 29 96 15  2 13 
2001 83 18  1 29  121  4  2 16 
2002  79  18 0 1  97 0  32  10 
2003  33  10 1 1  147 1  23 8 
2004 10 10 16  3  117  1 22 10 
2005 6  10  21 1  66 0  29 9 
2006  0 10  1  0  27 0  31 4 
2007  0 10  0  0  50 0  25 5  
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 Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, USA, 1955 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all agricultural products, to exportable 
and import-competing agricultural industries, and relative to non-agricultural 
industries        (percent) 
  NRA, all agric products,

























































1955  4 9  2  8 8 2 9 8  6 2
1956  4 9  5 11 11 2 9 11  6 5
1957  5 8  11 16 16 2 9 16  6 10
1958  5 6  11 16 16 3 8 16  6 9
1959  5 9  6 12 12 5 7 12  7 5
1960  3 7  6 11 11 2 7 10  7 3
1961  4 10  6  11 11 3 8 11  7 3
1962  5 6  5 10 10 2 9 10  8 3
1963  6 7  5 11 11 3 10 11  7 4
1964  6 8  4 11 11 3 11 11  7 4
1965  6 7  3 10 10 4 10 10  8 2
1966  7 4  3 10 10 6 7 10  8 2
1967  9 5  4 12 12 7 9 12  8 4
1968  8 7  3 11 11 8 8 12  7 4
1969  8 8  2 10 10 8 8 10  7 3
1970  8 7  2  9 9 7 8 10  7 3
1971  8 5  2  9 9 7 7 9  6 3
1972  7 6  1  8 8 7 6 8  6 2
1973  3 4  0  4 4 4 3 4  5 -1
1974  4 3  1  4 4 1 7 4  4 0
1975  4 3  1  5 5 1 8 5  4 1
1976  4 3  1  5 5 3 6 5  4 1
1977  5 5  2  7 7 2 10 7  4 3
1978  6 7  1  7 7 5 8 8  4 3
1979  6 6  1  7 8 4 10 7  4 3
1980  8 5  1  8 9 3 13 9  3 6
1981  9 5  2 10 12 4 15 11  3 7
1982  12 7  3 13 15 6 18 13  4 9
1983  15 10  2  15 30 7 22 15  4 11
1984  12 6  1 12 17 6 16 12  4 8
1985  17 10  1  16 25 12 21 17  4 13
1986  18 12  3  19 31 14 20 20  4 15
1987  17 12  3  18 29 14 18 18  4 14
1988  11 9  5 16 24 8 15 17  3 13
1989  17 11  2  17 23 5 31 18  3 14
1990  10 9  4 14 20 5 16 14  3 11
1991  12 9  4 14 20 6 17 15  3 11
1992  11 8  4 14 20 6 16 15  3 11
1993  13 9  3 15 21 8 18 15  3 12
1994  9 7  4 12 17 5 16 13  3 9
1995  3 5  4  8 10 3 6 7  3 5
1996  3 7  4  9 13 3 7 9  2 6
1997  4 7  5  9 14 3 7 9  2 7
1998  8 11  2  11 20 8 12 12  2 9
1999  13 13  1  14 25 13 13 15  2 13
2000  13 12  2  15 26 15 11 16  2 14
2001  16 11  3  18 27 11 21 19  2 17
2002  10 9  6 16 25 5 17 17  2 15
2003  8 7  6 14 21 5 13 15  2 13
2004  10 8  5 15 22 7 13 15  2 13
2005  9 8  7 16 23 9 10 16  1 15
2006  4 4  4  7 12 3 6 7  1 5
2007  5 4  3  7 10 2 10 7  1 5 
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a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-
product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled 
support.
 





t are the percentage NRAs for 
the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), 
respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.  
c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted 
average of columns (6) and (7).    
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Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, USA, 1955 to 2007 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 





1955 na  8  8 na 14 12  8 na  4 
1956 na  8  7 na 14 12  8 na  4 
1957 na 10  6 na 12 13 10 na  4 
1958 na 11  5 na 11 11 10 na  4 
1959 na 12  6 na 11 12  8 na  4 
1960 na 11  7 na 12 12  8 na  4 
1961 na 10  6 na 12 11  8  2  4 
1962 na 11  6 na 12 10  8  2  4 
1963 na 10  6 na 13  9  8  2  4 
1964 na 11  6 na 13 10  8  2  4 
1965 na 11  6 na 13  9  9  2  4 
1966 na 12  1 na 14 11 10  2  4 
1967 na 13  1 na 14 11  9  2  4 
1968 na 13  2 na 12 11  9  2  4 
1969 na 14  1 na 13 11 10  2  4 
1970 na 14  1 na 12 11 10  2  4 
1971 na 14  2 na 13 10  8  1  4 
1972 na 14  2 na 15  9  8  2  3 
1973 na 11  3 na 16  8  8  2  3 
1974 na 10  3 na 16  8  8  2  3 
1975 na  9  2 na 17  8  9  2  4 
1976 na 10  3 na 15 10  8  1  4 
1977 na 10  4 na 15  9  8  1  4 
1978 na 12  3 na 15  9  8  1  4 
1979  na  11 3 2  15 8 7 1 3 
1980  na  10 3 2  15 8 6 1 3 
1981  na  10 3 3  15 8 7 1 4 
1982  na  10 2 2  15 8 8 1 4 
1983  na  11 2 3  11 8 8 2 4 
1984  na  10 3 3  14 8 7 2 5 
1985  na  10 2 3  14 8 7 1 5 
1986 0  12 1 3 9 9 9 2 6 
1987 0  12 3 2  10 9 9 1 4 
1988 1  13 2 2 9 8 7 2 6 
1989 1  12 2 3  13 4 7 2 7 
1990 0  12 3 3  12 8 8 2 6 
1991 0  12 3 3  12 7 8 1 6 
1992 0  11 2 2  13 7 7 2 6 
1993 0  12 2 2  11 8 7 2 7 
1994 0  10 4 2  14 8 5 2 7 
1995 1  10 4 2  15 2 6 2 8 
1996 1 9 3 3  14 2 7 1 8 
1997 1  10 3 3  13 2 7 2 8 
1998 0  11 2 3  12 2 6 2  10 
1999 0  12 2 3  11 2 6 2  11 
2000 0  13 2 3  11 2 8 2  10 
2001 0  12 1 3  11 8 7 2  10 
2002 0  11 1 3  13 7 5 2 9 
2003 0  11 2 3  13 7 5 1 8 
2004 0  10 3 3  11 9 6 1  10 
2005 0  10 2 2 9  11 6 1  10 
2006 0  15 1 2  13 8 5 1 9 
2007 0  13 1 2  17 8 4 1 9  
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m Soybean  Sugar  Wheat  Wool 
Non-
covered  
1955 1  na  na 3 1 7  na  33 
1956 1  na  na 4 1 7  na  34 
1957 1  na  na 4 1 7  na  33 
1958 1  na  na 4 1 9  na  34 
1959 1  na  na 4 1 7  na  35 
1960 1  na  na 4 1 8  na  34 
1961 1  na  na 5 1 7  na  33 
1962 1  na  na 5 1 7  na  34 
1963 1  na  na 5 1 6  na  34 
1964 1  na  na 6 1 5  na  34 
1965 1  na  na 6 0 4  na  34 
1966 1  na  na 7 0 5  na  33 
1967 1  na  na 7 0 5  na  34 
1968 1  na  na 7 1 4  na  34 
1969 1  na  na 7 1 4  na  34 
1970 1  na  na 7 1 3  na  34 
1971 1  na  na 8 1 4  na  34 
1972 1  na  na  10 1 4  na  31 
1973 1  na  na  10 1 7  na  29 
1974 1  na  na 9 2 8  na  30 
1975 1  na  na 9 1 9  na  29 
1976 1  na  na  10 1 6  na  31 
1977 1  na  na  12 1 5  na  31 
1978 1  na  na  12 1 4  na  31 
1979 1 0 1  11 1 5  na  29 
1980 1 0 1  10 2 7  na  30 
1981 1 0 1 9 1 7  na  30 
1982 1 0 1 9 1 7  na  31 
1983 1 0 1  11 1 6  na  33 
1984 1 0 1 8 0 6  na  31 
1985 0 0 1 9 0 4  na  34 
1986 0 0 1 8 1 3 0  35 
1987 1 0 1 9 0 3 0  34 
1988 1 0 1 9 1 5 0  34 
1989 1 0 1 8 1 5 0  34 
1990 1 0 1 7 1 4 0  33 
1991 1 0 1 8 1 3 0  34 
1992 1 0 1 8 1 4 0  33 
1993 1 0 1 8 1 4 0  35 
1994 1 0 1 9 1 4 0  32 
1995 1 0 1 9 1 6 0  33 
1996 1 0 1  10 1 6 0  34 
1997 1 0 1  10 1 5 0  34 
1998 1 0 1 8 1 4 0  37 
1999 1 0 1 7 0 4 0  38 
2000 0 0 1 7 1 4 0  38 
2001 0 0 1 6 0 3 0  35 
2002 0 0 1 9 1 4 0  34 
2003 1 0 1  10 0 4 0  33 
2004 1 0 0 9 0 4 0  33 
2005 1 0 0 9 0 4 0  34 
2006 1 0 0 8 1 3 0  33 
2007 1 0 1 9 1 4 0  29 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices  
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Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, USA, 1955 to 2007 
 (d) Trade status of of covered products
a  
 





1955  na M X na XMMHX  
1956  na  M X na XMMHX  
1957  na  M X na XMMHX  
1958  na  M X na XMMHX  
1959  na  M X na XMMHX  
1960  na  M X na XMMHX  
1961  na  M X na XMMHX  
1962  na  M X na XMMHX  
1963  na  M X na XMMHX  
1964  na  M X na XMMHX  
1965  na  M X na XMMHX  
1966  na  M X na XMMHX  
1967  na  M X na XMMHX  
1968  na  M X na XMMHX  
1969  na  M X na XMMHX  
1970  na  M X na XMMHX  
1971  na  M X na XMMHX  
1972  na  M X na XMMHX  
1973  na  M X X X M M H X 
1974  na  M X X X M M H X 
1975  na  M X X X M M H X 
1976  na  M X X X M M H X 
1977  na  M X X X M M H X 
1978  na  M X X X M M H X 
1979  na  M X X X M M H X 
1980  M M X X X M M H X 
1981  M M X X X M M H X 
1982  M M X X X M M H X 
1983  M M X X X M M H X 
1984  M M X X X M M H X 
1985  M M X X X M M H X 
1986  M M X X X M M H X 
1987  M M X X X M M H X 
1988  M M X X X M M H X 
1989  M M X X X M M H X 
1990  M M X X X M M H X 
1991  M M X X X M M H X 
1992  M M X X X M M H X 
1993  M M X X X M M H X 
1994  M M X X X M M H X 
1995  M M X X X M M H X 
1996  M M X X X M M H X 
1997  M M X X X M M H X 
1998  M M X X X M M H X 
1999  M M X X X M M H X 
2000  M M X X X M M H X 
2001  M M X X X M M H X 
2002  na  M X na XMMHX  
2003  na  M X na XMMHX  
2004  na  M X na XMMHX  
2005  na  M X na XMMHX  
2006  na  M X na XMMHX  
2007  na  M X na XMMHX   
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m Soybean  Sugar  Wheat  Wool 
1955  X na  na XMXn a
1956  X na  na XMXn a
1957  X na  na XMXn a
1958  X na  na XMXn a
1959  X na  na XMXn a
1960  X na  na XMXn a
1961  X na  na XMXn a
1962  X na  na XMXn a
1963  X na  na XMXn a
1964  X na  na XMXn a
1965  X na  na XMXn a
1966  X na  na XMXn a
1967  X na  na XMXn a
1968  X na  na XMXn a
1969  X na  na XMXn a
1970  X na  na XMXn a
1971  X na  na XMXn a
1972  X na  na XMXn a
1973  X M X X M X na
1974  X M X X M X na
1975  X M X X M X na
1976  X M X X M X na
1977  X M X X M X na
1978  X M X X M X na
1979  X M X X M X na
1980  X M X X M X M
1981  X M X X M X M
1982  X M X X M X M
1983  X M X X M X M
1984  X M X X M X M
1985  X M X X M X M
1986  X M X X M X M
1987  X M X X M X M
1988  X M X X M X M
1989  X M X X M X M
1990  X M X X M X M
1991  X M X X M X M
1992  X M X X M X M
1993  X M X X M X M
1994  X M X X M X M
1995  X M X X M X M
1996  X M X X M X M
1997  X M X X M X M
1998  X M X X M X M
1999  X M X X M X M
2000  X M X X M X M
2001  X M X X M X M
2002  X na  na XMXn a
2003  X na  na XMXn a
2004  X na  na XMXn a
2005  X na  na XMXn a
2006  X na  na XMXn a
2007  X na  na XMXn a
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author’s spreadsheets    
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Appendix Table 11: Annual distortion estimates, Canada, 1961 to 2007 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 
 










1961  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 17 0 0  na 3 10
1962  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 17 0 0  na 3 9
1963  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 17 0 0  na 3 8
1964  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 17 0 0  na 3 8
1965  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 17 0 0  na 3 7
1966  2 1  na 4  34 0 2 0 17 0 0  na 3 7
1967  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 26 0 0  na 3 8
1968  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 20 0 0  na 3 8
1969  2 1  na 5  34 0 2 0 8 0 0  na 3 7
1970  2 1  na 4  34 0 2 0 21 0 0  na 3 7
1971  2 1  na 4  34 0 2 0 33 0 0  na 3 8
1972  2 1  na 4  34 0 2 0 49 0 0  na 3 7
1973  2 1  na 3  34 0 2 0 14 0 0  na 3 5
1974  2 1  na 2  34 0 2 0 51 0 0  na 3 7
1975  2 1  na 2  34 0 2 0 13 0 0  na 3 7
1976  2 1  na 2  115 0 2 0 40 0 0  na 3 14
1977  5 3  na 3  126 0 2 0 29 0 0  na 3 16
1978  10 1  na 2  275 0 2 0 18 0 0  na 3 20
1979  10  -1  25 2  264 0 2 0 22 0 0 9 3 23
1980  10 1  42 2  275 0 2 0 14 0 0  21 4 18
1981  5 3  46 2  275 0 2 0 32 0 0  37 4 25
1982  5 3  46 2  309 0 2 0 35 0 0  52 5 23
1983  10 1  45 2  332 0 2 0 27 0 0  25 6 23
1984  10 5  26 2  344 0 2 0 8 0 0  27 8 24
1985  15  4  38  13 378 0 2 0 19 10 2 122  12 30
1986  19  4  0  27 368 0 2 0 19 20 5 139  17 32
1987  16  5 29 14  480 0 2 0 36 18 0 67 19 34
1988  1 4  54 4  203 0 7 0 22 0 0  40 4 26
1989  1 3  29 5  142 0 18 0 23 0 6  30 0 21
1990  5 4  20 6  149 0 2 0 36 2 1  43 4 22
1991  2 5  28 2  226 0 6 0 41 0 0  37 1 23
1992  2 3  41 3  154 0 9 0 27 0 0  26 1 21
1993  2 6  38 0  163 0 3 0 19 0 0  29 0 19
1994  1 2  39 1  220 0 5 0 2 0 0  20 0 18
1995  1 2  39 1  108 0 5 0 2 0 0  19 1 13
1996  2 2  25 2  73 0 4 0 4 0 0  17 1 9
1997  1 2  30 3  110 0 1 0 5 0 0  na 0 12
1998  1 3  22 3  128 0 3 0 2 0 0  na 0 14
1999  2 2  22 7  128 0 6 0 1 0 2  na 0 14
2000  3 2 4  11  172 0 4 0 1 0 2  na 1 16
2001  3 1  12 9  77 0 2 0 1 0 2  na 1 11
2002  3 2  15 4  160 0 1 0 2 0 0  na 1 15
2003  2 2 0 8  132 0 2 0 7 0 1  na 1 15
2004  4  2 23 11 89 0 1 0 3 0 1 na  1 12
2005  3 2  55 9  81 0 1 0 1 0 1  na 1 11
2006 0 0  57 0  143 0 0 0 1 100  n a   01 4
2007 0 0  82 0  60 0 0 0 900  n a   09 
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Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Canada, 1961 to 2007 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all agricultural products, to exportable 
and import-competing agricultural industries, and relative to non-agricultural 
industries   (percent) 
  NRA, all agric products,

























































1961  10 7  na  9 9 4 16 9  9 0
1962  9 7  na  8 8 4 15 8  10 -2
1963  8 7  na  8 8 4 15 8  9 -1
1964  8 6  na  7 7 4 13 7  8 -1
1965  7 6  5 12 12 4 12 12  8 4
1966  7 6  5 11 11 3 11 11  8 3
1967  8 6  5 12 12 3 13 12  7 5
1968  8 5  5 12 12 3 12 12  6 5
1969  7 5  5 11 11 3 10 11  6 5
1970  7 5  6 13 13 3 11 13  6 7
1971  8 5  6 13 13 3 12 13  6 6
1972  7 5  5 12 12 3 13 12  6 5
1973  5 5  3  8 8 3 9 8  6 2
1974  7 6  3 10 10 3 15 10  6 4
1975  7 5  6 13 13 3 13 13  5 7
1976  14 9  7 20 20 4 29 20  5 14
1977  16 10  7  21 21 5 30 21  5 15
1978  20 12  5  24 24 5 41 24  5 18
1979  23 13  4  26 30 6 42 26  5 20
1980  18 11  9  27 31 6 35 27  5 21
1981  25 14  9  32 36 6 51 32  5 26
1982  23 13  9  31 34 6 49 31  5 25
1983  23 13  9  30 35 7 46 30  5 24
1984  24 14  9  32 39 7 45 32  4 27
1985  30 16  14  42 56 11 53 42  4 37
1986  32 17  15  44 53 14 53 44  4 39
1987  34 18  15  47 56 14 62 47  4 41
1988  26 13  13  37 44 7 48 37  4 31
1989  21 10  11  29 32 6 39 29  3 25
1990  22 11  14  34 41 6 44 34  3 29
1991  23 12  22  43 59 5 49 43  3 39
1992  21 11  13  33 42 6 41 33  3 29
1993  19 10  9  27 31 4 38 27  2 24
1994  18 9  5 22 25 4 38 22  2 20
1995  13 6  13 24 32 3 27 24  2 22
1996  9 5  8 17 23 2 28 17  1 15
1997  12 6  5 15 18 2 41 15  1 14
1998  14 7  7 19 23 3 42 19  1 18
1999  14 7  7 20 25 4 43 20  1 19
2000  16 8  9 23 31 4 54 23  1 23
2001  11 5  9 18 26 2 31 18  1 17
2002  15 8  12 25 36 4 44 25  1 24
2003  15 8  16 29 42 4 45 29  1 28
2004  12 6  14 24 36 3 36 24  1 23
2005  11 6  2 12 26 3 36 12  1 12
2006  14 9  2 13 24 0 65 13  1 12
2007  9 5  2  9 20 0 34 9  1 8
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-
product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled 
support.
 





t are the percentage NRAs for  
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the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), 
respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.  
c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted 
average of columns (6) and (7).    
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Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Canada, 1961 to 2007: 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
       (percent) 
 










1961  3 17 na  1 16 0 12 2 4 1 1 na 13 29
1962  5 14 na  1 12 0 10 1 4 0 0 na 23 30
1963  5 13 na  1 11 0 8 1 4 0 0 na 26 30
1964  4 17 na  2 11 0 8 2 4 1 0 na 22 29
1965  4 18 na  2 10 0 10 1 4 1 0 na 19 30
1966  6 20 na  2 9 0 11 2 4 1 1 na 24 21
1967  5 23 na  2 11 0 12 2 4 1 0 na 18 22
1968  6 24 na  2 11 0 11 2 4 1 0 na 16 23
1969  5 24 na  2 11 0 12 2 5 2 0 na 15 23
1970  6 24 na  3 11 0 14 2 4 3 1 na  8 24
1971  8 25 na  3 11 0 11 2 4 4 1 na 12 20
1972  10 22 na  3 10 0 12 2 3 3 1 na 14 20
1973  11 18 na  3 6 0 11 2 4 3 1 na 21 20
1974  10 17 na  3 10 0 11 2 3 4 1 na 19 20
1975  9 15 na  3 11 0 12 2 4 4 1 na 19 19
1976  9 20 na  3 8 0 11 2 3 2 1 na 22 17
1977  9 20 na  4 8 0 11 2 4 6 1 na 18 17
1978  6 22 na  4 5 0 11 1 4 8 1 na 21 15
1979  6  23 2 5 6 0 11 1 4 7 1 0  19 14
1980  9  20 2 5 4 0 10 3 4 4 1 0  21 14
1981  10  19 2 5 6 0 11 2 4 3 1 0  24 14
1982  8  19 2 5 5 0 14 2 3 4 1 0  24 13
1983  7  19 2 5 4 0 11 3 4 6 1 0  24 14
1984  7  19 2 6 5 0 12 2 6 7 2 0  19 14
1985  7  21 2 5 5 0 13 2 6 5 2 0  18 14
1986  6  20 3 3 5 0 15 3 7 4 1 0  17 17
1987  7  20 2 4 4 1 14 3 5 4 2 0  16 17
1988  7  20 2 4 8 0 12 3 6 6 2 0  13 17
1989  8  17 2 4 9 0 9 3 5 4 1 0  20 18
1990  8  16 2 4 9 0 11 3 5 4 2 0  18 18
1991  5  17 2 5 6 0 11 3 5 6 2 0  19 18
1992  5  18 2 3 8 1 11 3 6 6 2 0  15 19
1993  5  17 2 5 7 1 12 3 6 8 3 0  12 19
1994  4  16 2 4 6 1 11 3 6 12 3 0  11 19
1995  6  13 2 5 8 1 10 3 5 10 3 0  14 20
1996  7  11 2 6 8 1 10 2 5 7 3 0  17 20
1997  6  14 1 5 7 1 11 3 6 9 4  na  13 20
1998  5  15 1 5 7 1 8 3 6 11 3  na  11 22
1999  4  17 1 5 7 1 9 3 6 9 3  na  11 23
2000  4  19 2 3 6 1 13 3 6 6 3  na  11 23
2001  4  19 2 4 9 1 14 3 7 5 1  na 9 22
2002  4  18 2 6 6 1 12 4 6 6 3  na 8 23
2003  4  13 2 4 7 1 11 4 6 8 3  na  11 25
2004  4  14 1 4 8 2 12 3 6 9 3  na 9 25
2005  3  16 1 3 9 1 12 3 6 7 3  na  14 23
2006  4  17 1 4 7 1 11 3 5 8 3  na  12 25
2007  5  15 1 4 9 1 9 2 5 8 2  na  15 24
a.  At farmgate undistorted prices  
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Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Canada, 1961 to 2007 
 (d) Trade status of of covered products
a  





















1961  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a  X
1962  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1963  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1964  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1965  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1966  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1967  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1968  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1969  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1970  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1971  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1972  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1973  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1974  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1975  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1976  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1977  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1978  X M na  MMXXHMXM  n a   X
1979  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1980  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1981  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1982  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1983  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1984  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1985  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1986  X M M M M X X H M X M M X
1987  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1988  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1989  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1990  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1991  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1992  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1993  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1994  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1995  X M M M M X X H M X X M X
1996  X X M  M M X X H M X X  M X
1997  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
1998  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
1999  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2000  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2001  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2002  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2003  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2004  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2005  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2006  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
2007  X X M  M M X X H M X X  na  X
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author’s spreadsheets 
 